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The legislative department is everywhere extending 
the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its 
impetuous vortex. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although the Constitution vests the "[J]udicial Power" of the 
United States in the Supreme Court and in any inferior courts 
that Congress establishes, 2 both Congress3 and the Court4 have 
long propounded the traditional view that the inferior courts may 
be deprived cognizance of some of the cases and controversies that 
fall within that power.5 Is this view fully consonant with the 
1 THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 279 (James Madison) (Am. Bar Aas'n 2009). 
2 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
3 See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 73--82 (establishing inferior federal 
courts and then limiting their jurisdiction to a subset of the cases and controversies 
identified in Article 111); see also Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power 
to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 
124 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 46 n.4 (1975) (citing and collecting various other examples of 
congressional enactments limiting the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts). For a more 
recent and controversial instance of congressional jurisdiction-stripping, see the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2623 (2006) (amended 2009): 
[N]o court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any 
claim or cause of action whatsoever, including any action pending on or 
filed after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 
2006, relating to the prosecution, trial, or judgment of a military 
commission under this chapter, including challenges to the lawfulness of 
procedures of military commissions under this chapter. 
• See, e.g., United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812) ("[T]he power 
which congress possess [sic] to create Courts of inferior jurisdiction, necessarily implies the 
power to limit the jurisdiction of those Courts to particular objects .... "); Palmore v. United 
States, 411 U.S. 389, 401 (1973) ("[Congress) was not constitutionally required to create 
inferior Art. III courts to hear and decide cases within the judicial power of the United 
States .... Nor, if inferior federal courts were created, was it required to invest them with 
all the jurisdiction it was authorized to bestow under Art. III. "). 
5 See Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article Ill, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 
1569 (1990) ("[T]he traditional view of article III [is] that Congress has plenary authority 
over federal court jurisdiction. According to that view, Congress may deprive the lower 
federal courts, the Supreme Court, or all federal courts of jurisdiction over any cases within 
the federal judicial power, excepting only those few that fall within the Supreme Court's 
original jurisdiction."). Current statutes reflective of this traditional view are too numerous 
to mention here, but one of the most familiar is the federal diversity jurisdiction statute. 
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history and text of Article III? One possible reading of those 
sources suggests that the Constitution vests the full Judicial 
Power of the United States in the inferior federal courts, ·directly 
extending to them jurisdiction over matters that Congress may not 
abridge. This position is controversial and has been rejected.6 
However, my goal here is to explore whether the text, structure, 
and history of Article III provide any support for this contention. 
When one consults the record of debates surrounding the 
drafting and adoption of the Constitution and analyzes the 
constitutional text in light of insights gained from those debates, it 
seems that the "plan of the Convention"7 was to create an 
independent and equal branch of government fully capable of 
exercising the Judicial Power of the United States free from the 
control of the other branches and empowered to give greater effect 
to the superior authority of the central government and its laws 
than had been the case under the Articles of Confederation. 
Indeed, the Framers of the Constitution expressly considered and 
rejected language that would have undermined that central plan 
by investing Congress with the very authority over the Federal 
Judiciary that Congress and the Court have presumed to exist. 
Thus, although our system envisions certain checks and balances 
among the three branches of government, conceding congressional 
authority to manipulate the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts is 
in some tension with notions of judicial independence the Framers 
seemingly embraced and pursued.8 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) (limiting federal courts to cognizance of diversity cases 
involving disputes where more than $75,000 is in controversy). 
6 See, e.g., Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 n.1 (1799) (footnote by Chase, 
J.) ("The notion has frequently been entertained, that the federal Courts derive their 
judicial power immediately from the constitution; but the political truth is, that the disposal 
of the judicial power, (except in a few specified instances) belongs to congress."); see also 
Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. 
REV. 1030, 1031 (1982) ("The position that the Constitution obligates Congress to create 
lower federal courts, or (having created them) to vest them with some or all of the 
jurisdiction authorized by article III, has been repudiated by an unbroken line of 
authoritative judicial and legislative precedent."). 
7 See infra Part II (defining and exploring the concept). 
8 These questions are not merely academic but are of the greatest import. For example, 
the importance of the jurisdictional issue derives, in part, from the fact that Congress has 
frequently used jurisdiction-stripping to register its disagreement with and to control how 
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There have been only a few challenges to the received wisdom 
blessing congressional control over inferior court jurisdiction, 9 
even though there is a long tradition of scholarship-penned by 
the likes of Justice Joseph Story and Professor Henry Hart-that 
the federal courts exercise the Judicial Power. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART 
AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 321 (5th ed. 2003) 
("[P]erhaps the most controversial proposals to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts 
have been those that reflect a substantive disagreement with the way the Supreme Court, 
the lower federal courts, or both have resolved particular issues."). 
9 Professor Robert N. Clinton, in A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A 
Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article Ill, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984), 
offers a historical analysis of the question similar to that presented in this Article, although 
with different areas of emphasis and differing conclusions. See id. at 746--48 ("This Article 
will examine the history surrounding the drafting and ratification of the judicial article in 
order to discern any original intention of the framers that might be relevant to current 
debates over the source and scope of congressional power over the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts." (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)); id. at 749--50 ("The conclusion of this inquiry 
is that the framers, by providing that '[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to 
time ordain and establish,' intended to mandate. that Congress allocate to the federal 
judiciary as a whole each and every type of case or controversy defined as part of the 
judicial power of the United States .. .. " (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted) (quoting 
U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 1)); see also Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal 
Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 913 
(1984) ("There have been very few academics who have suggested that there are substantial 
internal restraints .. . on congressional authority over lower federal courts.'); Caprice L. 
Roberts, Jurisdiction Stripping in Three Acts: A Three String Serenade, 51 VILL. L. 
REV. 593, 622-25, 630--31 (2006) (relating a fictitious dialogue in which a Supreme Court 
Justice expresses concerns about the constitutional propriety of jurisdiction-stripping 
legislation); Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' 
Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 21-22, 67 
(1981) (arguing that although Congress has the authority to restrict the Article III 
jurisdiction of inferior federal courts, this authority must be exercised within constitutional 
limitations and be subject to full judicial review). Although in one of his writings Professor 
Charles Warren did well to acknowledge that "the strong pro-Constitution men" who "took 
the position that Congress had no power to withhold from the Federal Courts which it 
should establish any of the judicial power granted by the Constitution" were probably in the 
right, he did not further endorse or advocate for the position and indeed indicated that its 
failure to hold sway "was extremely fortunate for the United States." Charles Warren, New 
Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 67-69 (1923). 
Scholars likely have eschewed a direct challenge to the traditional view because the 
Supreme Court early on affirmed without reservation that Congress has the power to limit 
the jurisdiction of lower federal courts to a subset of the Judicial Power set forth in 
Article Ill. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) ("Congress may withhold 
from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies. Courts 
created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers .... Such has 
been the doctrine held by this court since its first establishment.''). 
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has otherwise thoroughly analyzed the nature of Congress's 
authority with respect to the Federal Judiciary.10 This Article 
does not take up that challenge so much as it attempts to revive 
the debate. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II examines the debates in 
the Federal Constitutional Convention and those of the various 
state ratifying conventions to discover the original understanding 
of the nature and scope of the Judicial Power. These discussions, 
as well as the proposal and amendment process of the Framers 
during the Federal Convention, will be combined with the 
perspective offered in The Federalist to arrive at a general 
understanding of the plan of the Convention with respect to the 
Judicial Power and the Federal Judiciary. Part III details the 
traditional view that Congress has the authority to limit the 
jurisdiction of inferior federal courts. Part IV offers a possible 
alternative to this traditional view, questioning Congress's 
authority to pare down the Judicial Power to be exercised by 
inferior Article III courts-the constitutional vesting thesis-and 
concludes with a discussion of some implications of this idea. 
10 The debate over the nature of Congress's authority with respect to the inferior federal 
courts has been long and robust. Justice Story long ago set forth his vision that the "shall" 
language in Article Ill's Vesting Clause meant that the entire Federal Judicial Power must 
be vested in some federal court; thus, to the extent that Congress deprives the Supreme 
Court of jurisdiction over matters falling within the Judicial Power, Congress is obligated to 
create inferior federal courts invested with cognizance of those matters. Martin v. Hunter's 
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 331 (1816) ("[C]ongress are bound to create some inferior 
courts, in which to vest all that jurisdiction which, under the constitution, is exclusively 
vested in the United States, and of which the supreme court cannot take original 
cognizance."). Hart moved the debate forward by affirming the traditional view that 
Congress has plenary authority over federal court jurisdiction, see Henry M. Hart, Jr., The 
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 
HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1363-64 (1953) ("Congress seems to have plenary power to limit federal 
jurisdiction when the consequence is merely to force proceedings to be brought, if at all, in a 
state court."), but did so with the caveat that Congress may make such exceptions to the 
Supreme Court's jurisdiction "such as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court 
in the constitutional plan." Id. at 1365. 
6 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1 
II. THE PLAN OF THE CONVENTION 
Any exploration of the meaning and import of the Article III 
Judicial Power must begin with a review of the evidence from the 
deliberations from the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787 
and the subsequent state ratifying conventions. Here, one finds 
the organic development of the language of Article III from its 
initial proposal through final approval and the accompanying 
sentiments, rationales, and understandings of those called to 
shape or to approve the resulting text. The organic development of 
Article Ill's language is significant because it reveals language and 
provisions considered and rejected, giving us insight into what the 
Framers intended the Article to accomplish and what powers they 
explicitly did not approve. 
The evidence of drafting revisions and the accompanying debate 
of the Convention delegates, coupled with the debates of the 
delegates to the state conventions, reveal what has been termed 
the "plan of the Convention."11 The plan of the Convention as it 
pertains to the Judicial Power interests scholars here. What was 
the Framers' intent with respect to the assignment of the Judicial 
Power to various elements within the federal government? What 
relationship was envisioned for Congress and the Judiciary? How 
did the Framers understand that the new Constitution would 
protect judicial independence? What role did separation of powers 
doctrine play in this regard and what steps did the Framers take 
to further the doctrine? Below, this Article will discuss early 
materials pertaining to the drafting and consideration of the 
Constitution with an eye toward answering some of these 
questions. 
11 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 479-80 ("The 
plan of the convention, in the first place, authorizes the national legislature 'to constitute 
tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.' It declares, in the next place, that 'the Judicial 
Power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior 
courts as Congress shall ... ordain and establish.'" (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)). 
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A. THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 
The debates on the Constitution reveal the evolution of the 
Judiciary Article in the direction of less congressional control and 
expanded judicial authority. The starting point for debate in the 
Federal Convention was a set of proposed resolutions offered by 
Edmund Randolph of Virginia. The ninth of these concerned the 
Judiciary for the new government and read as follows: 
Res[olved] that a National Judiciary be established to 
consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of 
inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National 
Legislature, to hold their offices during good 
behaviour; and to receive punctually at stated times 
fixed compensation for their services, in which no 
increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the 
persons actually in office at the time of such increase 
or diminution. [T]hat the jurisdiction of the inferior 
tribunals shall be to hear [and] determine in the first 
instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and 
determine in the [last] resort, all piracies [and] felonies 
on the high seas, captures from an enemy; cases in 
which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to 
such jurisdictions may be interested, or which respect 
the collection of the National revenue; impeachments 
of any National officers, and questions which may 
involve the national peace and harmony.12 
Several aspects of this draft are noteworthy. First, the resolution 
vests the Legislature with authority to designate inferior 
tribunals. Second, in this draft we find a direct vesting of 
jurisdiction in the "inferior tribunals" as evidenced by the 
language "the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be." 
12 1 JAMES MADISON, Session of Tuesday, May 29, 1787, in THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION WHICH OF 1787 FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 21, 25 (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., 1987) [hereinafter DEBATES IN 
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION]. 
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Third, the "supreme tribunal" enjoys only appellate jurisdiction. 13 
Finally, the draft defines the jurisdiction of the federal courts 
vaguely as embracing "questions which may involve the national 
peace and harmony." Most relevant to our discussion are the first 
two. 
The authority to "choose" inferior tribunals is the extent of the 
role that the text gives the National Legislature; it specifies none 
other. Then, the draft directly vests in the inferior federal courts 
jurisdiction over a specified class of cases: the proposed text states 
that "the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear [and] 
determine in the first instance" certain specified cases and 
controversies. 14 These two aspects of the proposed language leave 
little room for the notion that the legislature has the authority to 
curtail inferior court jurisdiction, or at least this particular 
provision would not have served as a basis for presuming such 
authority. The questions are what became of this language and 
whether the proposal was revised in any way that enlarged or 
permitted legislative authority in such a direction. 
After a summer of debate, on August 6, 1787 the Convention's 
Committee of Detail prepared and presented a draft of the 
Constitution to the Convention delegates. This draft spoke of the 
power of the federal courts in what was then Article XI as follows: 
Sect. 1. The Judicial Power of the United States 
shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such 
inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time to 
time, be constituted by the Legislature of the United 
States. 
Sect. 2. The Judges of the Supreme Court, and of 
the Inferior Courts, shall hold their offices during good 
behaviour. They shall, at stated times, receive for 
their services, a compensation, which shall not be 
diminished during their continuance in office. 
13 See id. ("[T]hat the jurisdiction . . .  of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine in 
the [last] resort . . . .  "). 
t4 Id. 
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Sect. 3. The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall 
extend to all cases arising under laws passed by the 
Legislature of the United States; to all cases affecting 
Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls; to 
the trial of impeachments of officers of the United 
States; to all cases of Admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction; to controversies between two or more 
States, (except such as shall regard Territory or 
Jurisdiction) between a State and Citizens of another 
State, between Citizens of different States, and 
between a State or the Citizens thereof and foreign 
States, citizens or subjects. In cases of impeachment, 
cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers 
and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be party, 
this jurisdiction shall be original. In all the other 
cases beforementioned, it shall be appellate, with such 
exceptions and under such regulations as the 
Legislature shall make. The Legislature may assign 
any part of the jurisdiction abovementioned ( except 
the trial of the President of the United States) in the 
manner, and under the limitations which it shall think 
proper, to such Inferior Courts, as it shall constitute 
from time to time. 15 
9 
By this point, the drafters had made a raft of substantial 
alterations. A distinction between the "Judicial Power of the 
United States" and the "Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court" had 
arisen, with the latter confined to a more specifically delineated 
list of cases and controversies than found in the initial proposal. 
Interestingly, the draft conferred this jurisdiction directly upon 
the Supreme Court with "the Legislature" possessing the power to 
"assign any part of the jurisdiction abovementioned . . .  in the 
manner, and under the limitations which it shall think proper, to 
such Inferior Courts." Here, there was an explicit vesting in the 
Legislature of the authority to take the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
15 Session of Monday, August 6, 1787, in 2 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra 
note 12, at 337, 344. 
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Court and distribute some subset of that jurisdiction to the inferior 
federal courts as it sees fit. With this language that authority 
would be plenary and unquestionable. 
In late August of 1787, the Convention delegates took up 
consideration of Article XI dealing with the Judiciary. On August 
27, 1787, James Madison and Gouverneur Morris moved for-and 
the Convention approved-a change in the language of section 3 of 
that article by striking "The jurisdiction of the supreme Court" and 
replacing it with "the Judicial power."16 The effect of this change 
was substantial. No longer did the first clause of section 3 refer 
only to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; rather, the 
enumerated cases were now proper to the full scope of "the 
Judicial power," which-per section 1-was vested both in the 
Supreme Court "and in" any inferior courts created by Congress. 
Although the revision vested the inferior federal courts with a 
Judicial Power that extended to the enumerated cases and 
controversies of section 3, the final clause of that section still 
authorized Congress to "assign any part of the jurisdiction 
abovementioned . . .  under the limitations which it shall think 
proper, to such Inferior Courts." Thus, this language would have 
given Congress the authority to restrict the jurisdiction of the 
lower federal courts to some subset of what the larger Judicial 
Power might comprehend. Of course, vesting Congress with such 
authority would have been in tension with the vesting of the 
Judicial Power in the inferior federal courts. If Congress could 
determine which part of that power the lower courts could 
exercise, then it would nowise be true that those inferior courts 
fully possessed the "Judicial Power of the United States." In what 
might have been an effort to resolve that tension, the Convention 
unanimously approved a motion to strike the entire last sentence 
in section 3 beginning with "The Legislature may assign . . . .  "17 
This change indeed was the most dramatic and the most critical to 
our discussion. The draft no longer vested the Legislature with 
plenary authority to determine what portion of the federal 
16 Session of Monday, August 27, 1787, in 2 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, 
supra note 12, at 471, 475. 
17 Id. at 476. 
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jurisdiction the inferior federal courts would enjoy; rather, the 
revised text stripped the Legislature of such power and placed 
those inferior federal courts on equal footing with the Supreme 
Court with respect to possessing the Judicial Power, save where 
the provision reserved matters to the Supreme Court's original 
jurisdiction. 
As they were trimming back congressional authority to limit the 
jurisdiction of inferior federal courts, the delegates to the 
Convention also rebuffed an effort to extend to Congress additional 
power over the Judiciary. When a motion was made to insert at 
the end of section 3, "In all the other cases before mentioned the 
Judicial power shall be exercised in such manner as the 
Legislature shall direct," the Convention delegates rejected the 
motion by a vote of 6-to-2. 18 Although discussion of this item does 
not appear in Madison's notes of the debates, one can imagine that 
delegates deemed the proposed insertion to be at odds with the 
majority's sentiment that Congress had no business interfering 
with the Federal Judiciary's exercise of the Judicial Power. 
Indeed, the combination of extending the Judicial Power to the 
inferior federal courts, the shearing of congressional authority to 
"assign any part of the jurisdiction abovementioned," and the 
rejection of the idea that Congress should be able to "direct" the 
"manner" in which "the Judicial power shall be exercised" stands 
as a clear victory for judicial independence and a repudiation of 
the idea that the Judicial Branch should be subordinate to 
Congress rather than its co-equal sibling. 
The only accession to congressional authority over judicial 
matters left intact after these amendments-besides authority in 
section 1 to constitute inferior federal tribunals-was the 
authority in section 3 to make "exceptions" and "regulations" 
governing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. On 
August 28, 1787, the Convention approved a motion to strike the 
words "it shall be appellate" and to insert the words "the supreme 
Court shall have appellate jurisdiction," in section 3 of Article Xl.19 
18 Id. at 475-76. 
19 Session of Tuesday, August 28, 1787, in 2 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, 
supra note 12, at 4 76, 4 76. 
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The rationale reported in Madison's notes was "to prevent 
uncertainty whether 'it' referred to the supreme Court, or to the 
Judicial power."20 Thus, it was clear that the Judicial Power was 
not to be limited to appellate review and that Congress's power to 
make "exceptions" and "regulations" applied not to the exercise of 
the Judicial Power but only to the appellate jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court.21 
A final detail worth noting is that the Convention delegates 
rejected a motion by Madison and James McHenry to reinsert the 
words "increased or" before the word "diminished" in section 2. 22 
Had this change been made, Congress would have been 
constitutionally prevented from increasing judicial pay for existing 
federal judges. The delegates felt that increases would be 
necessary to counter the effects of inflation and to compensate 
judges properly for the inevitable increase in judicial business they 
would have to manage as the country aged. 23 Although Madison 
20 Id. 
21 Collecting these amendments together, section 3 would have then read as follows: 
The Judicial Power shall extend to all cases arising under laws passed by 
the Legislature of the United States; to all cases affecting Ambassadors, 
other Public Ministers and Consuls; to the trial of impeachments of officers 
of the United States; to all cases of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to 
controversies between two or more States, (except such as shall regard 
Territory or Jurisdiction) between a State and Citizens of another State, 
between Citizens of different States, and between a State or the Citizens 
thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects. In cases of impeachment, 
cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls, and 
those in which a State shall be party, this jurisdiction shall be original. In 
all the other cases beforementioned, the supreme Court shall have 
appellate jurisdiction, with such exceptions and under such regulations as 
the Legislature shall make. 
See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text (presenting draft of then Article XI and 
discussing subsequent revisions). 
22 Session of Monday, August 27, 1787, in 2 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, 
supra note 12, at 271, 274. The initial proposal to the Convention had prohibited the 
"increase or diminution" of judicial compensation. Session of Tuesday, May 29, 1787, in 1 
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 12, at 21,  25. 
23 See Session of Wednesday, July 18, 1787 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris), in 2 
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 12, at 274, 278 (''The value of money 
may not only alter but the State of Society may alter. In this event the same quantity of 
wheat, the same value would not be the same compensation. The Amount of salaries must 
always be regulated by the manners [and] the style of living in a Country. The increase of 
business can not, be provided for in the supreme tribunal [by increasing the number of 
201 1] THE JUDICIAL POWER 13 
suggested that the power to increase would be a slight weight 
against judicial independence in the event the judges became 
overly desirous of a raise, the Convention seemed to disagree, or at 
least to place more value on the need to attract the best talent to 
the federal bench. 24 
The draft that the Committee on Style presented to the 
Convention for final consideration contained a judiciary article 
that closely tracked the language ultimately adopted as Article III 
of the U.S. Constitution, with the enumeration of cases and 
controversies falling within the Judicial Power moving to Section 2 
of the Article. 2s 
judges]. All the business of a certain description whether more or less must be done in that 
single tribunal. Additional labor alone in the Judges can provide for additional business. 
Additional compensation therefore ought not to be prohibited."). 
24 See Session of Monday, August 27, 1787 (remarks of Charles Cotesworth Pinkney), in 2 
DEBATES OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 12, at 471, 474 (''The importance of the 
Judiciary will require men of the first talents: large salaries will therefore be necessary, 
larger than the U.S. can allow in the first instance." (footnote omitted)). 
25 Session of Wednesday, September 12, 1787, in 2 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION, supra note 12, at 545, 551-52: 
Sect. 1. The judicial power of the United States, both in law and equity, 
shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of 
the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good 
behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a 
compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in 
office. 
Sect. 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, both in law and 
equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and 
treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority. To all cases 
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. To all cases of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. To controversies to which the United 
States shall be a party. To controversies between two or more States; 
between a state and citizens of another state; between-citizens of different 
States; between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of 
different States, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign 
States, citizens or subjects. 
In cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and 
those in which a state shall be party, the supreme court shall have original 
jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the supreme court 
shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such 
exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. 
The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; 
and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have 
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B. THE DEBATES IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS 
The proceedings of the state ratifying conventions are useful for 
gaining some insight into the meaning ascribed to the words of the 
Constitution by people of the day.26 A central concern among state 
convention delegates was the scope of the jurisdiction given to the 
federal courts by Article III. The Massachusetts Convention 
addressed these concerns by ratifying the Constitution but 
recommending several amendments. Relevant to our discussion is 
the seventh proposal: 
Seventhly. The Supreme Judicial Federal Court 
shall have no jurisdiction of causes between citizens of 
different states, unless the matter in dispute, whether 
it concern the realty or personalty, be of the value of 
three thousand dollars at the least; nor shall the 
federal judicial powers extend to any action between 
citizens of different states, where the matter in 
dispute, whether it concern the realty or personalty, is 
been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall 
be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed. 
26 For a discussion of the various originalist approaches of looking to the drafters versus 
the ratifiers of the Constitution for insight into its original meaning, see Thomas B. Colby & 
Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 249-50 (2009): 
Even in the early days of "original intent" originalism, there was internal 
disagreement about the proper focus of the inquiry. The "intent of the 
Framers" was a misleading abstraction that implied a degree of agreement 
that was not really there. Just who were the "Framers" whose intentions 
mattered: the men who drafted the text of the Constitution and agreed 
upon it at the Philadelphia convention, or the men whose ratification votes 
at the subsequent state conventions gave it the force of law? The early 
originalists could not agree on the answer to that question. 
For another useful discussion of originalism as an approach to constitutional interpretation, 
see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are They 
Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. PUB. & POL 'v 5, 5 (2011) ("Although it is 
customary to speak of originalism as a single constitutional theory, even a cursory review of 
recent scholarship reveals that the range of originalist theories has grown startlingly broad 
and diverse and is becoming more so all the time. So great are the differences among 
originalist theories that I question the premise that we can talk meaningfully about 
Originalism . . . .  "). 
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not of the value of fifteen hundred dollars at the 
least.27 
15 
What does this tell us about the understanding that 
Massachusetts Convention delegates had of the Constitution? 
Well, if these delegates felt there was a need to amend the 
Constitution to limit the Federal Judicial Power to diversity 
actions valued at $1 ,500 or more, that may indicate they believed 
that the Constitution as presented to them permitted inferior 
courts to exercise jurisdiction in actions of any dollar amount.28 It 
is instructive, then, that the delegates offered an amendment of 
this kind; it may be that the Massachusetts delegates had some 
sense that unless the Framers adopted this type of amendment, 
the federal courts would hear diversity cases in which less than 
$1,500 was in dispute. If the Massachusetts delegates had an 
understanding that the description of the Judicial Power in 
Article III did not vest such jurisdiction in the inferior federal 
courts and that Congress itself could limit the cognizance of the 
federal courts in the manner that the Massachusetts amendment 
proposed, one can at least doubt whether the Massachusetts 
delegates would have felt compelled to propose such a specific 
amendment. The Convention of Maryland reached like 
conclusions and proposed amending language to attach an amount 
in controversy to the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts.29 
27 Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Feb. 5, 1788), 
reprinted in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1, 177 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott 
1891) [hereinafter E.LLIOT'S DEBATES]. 
28 Admittedly, it could also mean that Massachusetts delegates were concerned that 
Congress would not impose any limitations on inferior federal court jurisdiction. 
29 The amendment proposed by the Maryland delegates read as follows: 
That the inferior federal courts shall not have jurisdiction of less than 
__ dollars; and there may be an appeal, in all cases of revenue, as well 
to matter of fact as law; and Congress may give the state courts jurisdiction 
of revenue cases, for such forms, and in such manner, as they may think 
proper. 
A Fragment of Facts, Disclosing the Conduct of the Maryland Convention (Apr. 24, 1788), 
reprinted in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 547, 550 (blank space appears in the 
original). Explaining the amendment, the Convention wrote, that one of "[t]he great objects 
of these amendments [was] . . . [t]o give a concurrent jurisdiction to the state courts, in 
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Similar efforts to amend the text of Article III arose out of the 
New York Convention. Delegates there proposed a slew of 
amendments that would curtail the scope of the Judicial Power. 
For example, the first amendment offered to Article III read as 
follows: 
Resolved, as the op1mon of this c<>mmittee, that 
nothing in the Constitution now under consideration 
contained shall be construed so as to authorize the 
Congress to constitute, ordain, or establish, any 
tribunals, or inferior courts, with any other than 
appellate jurisdiction, except such as may be necessary 
for trial of causes of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction, and for the trial of piracies and felonies 
committed on the high seas; and in all other cases to 
which the judicial power of the United States extends, 
and in which the Supreme Court of the United States 
has no original jurisdiction, the cause shall be heard, 
tried, and determined in some of the state courts . . . .  30 
This proposal is interesting because it reflected a concern with the 
breadth of authority that the Constitution appeared to vest in the 
inferior federal courts and because it portended a debate that 
would recur in the First Congress over the scope of inferior federal 
court jurisdiction.31 
The former point-the breadth of inferior federal court 
authority that concerned New York's delegates-is mildly 
instructive because it again suggests there was a sense that the 
text vested those courts with power in such cases if the 
Constitution was approved with its proposed language intact. One 
order that Congress may not be compelled, as they will be under the present form, to 
establish inferior federal courts ... . " Id. at 560--51. Although the idea that Congress 
would be obligated to establish inferior federal courts is inconsistent with the plain 
language of Article III, the sentiment that Article III was in some respects imperative is 
noteworthy. 
30 The Debates in the Convention of the State of New York (July 5, 1788), reprinted in 2 
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 205, 408. 
31 See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. 
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could surmise that the delegates believed only an amendment of 
the kind suggested above could· ensure that this was not the case 
since there was no discussion of any notion that Congress could 
step in and curtail the jurisdiction in the manner the amendment 
desired. The latter point-that this amendment foreshadowed a 
central debate within the First Congress surrounding the 
Judiciary Act of 1789-is interesting because it offers some 
confirmation of the claim that members of the First Congress were 
fighting battles that they had lost during the various 
Constitutional Conventions.32 The New York delegates proposed 
other jurisdiction-curbing amendments,33 each of which only 
32 See infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text. 
33 The series of proposed additional amendments to Article Ill read as follows: 
Resolve 1. "Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that all appeals 
from any courts in this state, proceeding according to the course of the 
common law, are to be by writ of error, and not otherwise." 
Res. 2. "Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that no judge of the 
Supreme Court of the United States shall, during his continuance in office, 
hold any other office under the United States, or any of them." 
Res. 3. "Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the judicial power 
of the United States, as to controversies between citizens of the same state, 
claiming lands under grants of different states, extends only to 
controversies relating to such lands as shall be claimed by two or more 
persons, under grants of different states." 
Res. 4. "Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that nothing in the 
Constitution now under consideration contained, is to be construed to 
authorize any suit to be brought against any state, in any manner what 
ever." 
Res. 5. "Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the judicial power 
of the United States, in cases in which a state shall be a party, is not to be 
construed to extend to criminal prosecutions." 
Res. 6. "Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the judicial power 
of the United States, as to controversies between citizens of different states, 
is not to be construed to extend to any controversy relating to any real 
estate not claimed under grants of different states." 
Res. 7. "Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the judicial power 
of the United States, as to controversies between citizens of the same state, 
claiming lands under grants of different states, extends only to 
controversies relating to such lands as shall be claimed by two or more 
persons, under grants of different states." 
Res. 8. "Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the person 
aggrieved by any judgment, sentence, or decree of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as the 
Congress shall make concerning the same, ought, upon application, to have 
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buttresses the view that they felt that the originally proposed text 
vested the inferior federal courts with the authority to hear all of 
the cases enumerated in Article III, Section 2 unless some 
amendments were made. 
Delegates to Pennsylvania's convention also pondered the scope 
of federal jurisdiction, with some contending that it was too broad. 
In response to this charge, James Wilson-also a delegate to the 
Federal Convention-offered the following defense of the breadth 
of the Judicial Power: 
He said, "that the judicial powers were coextensive 
with the legislative powers, and extend even to capital 
cases." I believe they ought to be coextensive; 
otherwise, laws would be framed that could not be 
executed. Certainly, therefore, the executive and 
judicial departments ought to have power 
commensurate to the extent of the laws; for, as I have 
already asked, are we to give power to make laws, and 
no power to carry them into effect?34 
Concededly, the suggestion that the Judicial Power should 
generally be coextensive with the power of the national 
government does not necessarily mean that the power of the 
a commission, to be issued by the President of the United States, to such 
learned men as he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent 
of the Senate, appoint, not less than seven, authorizing such 
commissioners, or any seven or· more of them, to correct the errors in such 
judgment, or to review such sentence and decree, as the case may be, and to 
do justice to the parties in the premises." 
Res. 9. "Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, or of any other court to be 
instituted by the Congress, ought not, in any case, to be increased, 
enlarged, or extended, by any fiction, collusion, or mere suggestion." 
The Debates in the Convention of the State of New York (July 5, 1788), reprinted in 2 
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 205, 408--09. 
34 The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania (Dec. 4, 1787), reprinted in 
2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 415, 469; see also id. at 489 (''The article respecting 
the judicial department is objected to as going too far . . . . Controversies may certainly 
arise under this Constitution and the laws of the United States, and is it not proper that 
there should be judges to decide them?"). 
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inferior federal courts must be coextensive in that regard. Rather, 
Wilson could have meant that the Judicial Power as exercised 
collectively by the Federal Judiciary would need to be coextensive 
with the Legislature's power or that at a minimum the Supreme 
Court needed to have authority of such breadth.35 Nevertheless, it 
is also possible to see in this logic support for the idea that the 
inferior courts require jurisdiction coextensive with the power of 
the national government so that all of its laws might be 
enforceable.36 In light of the language of Article III that Wilson 
was defending-that the Judicial Power of the United States is 
vested "in such inferior Courts" as Congress may establish-one 
can at least legitimately use Wilson's defense of the coextensive 
scope of the Judicial Power to argue that the inferior courts in 
which such power is vested should have such coextensive authority 
as well. 
Although not a proponent of expansive federal court 
jurisdiction, Virginia's Patrick Henry revealed that he understood 
the Constitution to confer upon the federal courts jurisdiction to 
the extent indicated by the enumerated cases and controversies. 
In opposing so empowering the federal courts he argued, 
The sheriff comes to-day as a state collector. Next day 
he is federal. How are you to fix him? How will it be 
possible to discriminate oppressions committed in one 
capacity from those perpetrated in the 
other? . . .  When you fix him, where are you to punish 
36 This would be a view in line with the one articulated by Justice Story in Martin v. 
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 331 (1816). See also infra notes 104---05 and 
accompanying text. 
36 Edmund Pendleton made the point about the need for the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts to be coextensive with the authority of the national government and suggested that 
the notion applied to the inferior courts as well as the Supreme Court: 
[T]he power of that judiciary must be coextensive with the legislative 
power, and reach to all parts of society intended to be governed. They must 
be so arranged, that there must be some court which shall be the central 
point of their operations; and because all the business cannot be done in 
that part, there must be inferior courts to carry it on. 
The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia (June 18, 1788), reprinted 
in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at l, 517. 
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him? [F]or I suppose they will not stay in our courts: 
they must go to the federal court; for, if I understand 
that paper right, all controversies arising under that 
Constitution, or under the laws made in pursuance 
thereof, are to be tried in that court. 37 
Of course one could argue that Henry was simply vmcmg his 
opinion that federal question cases were mandatorily vested in the 
federal courts.38 Nevertheless, the statement is reflective of the 
sentiment common among delegates to the state conventions that 
the grant of authority to the federal courts was quite broad. The 
quotation is also typical in that it offers no hint of an 
understanding that Congress could intervene to pare down the 
jurisdiction granted to the federal courts. One might imagine that 
opponents would have tempered their objections to some extent if 
they believed this to be the case; proponents of the proposed 
Federal Judiciary might have pointed to such a feature to pacify 
the concerns of opponents had it been thought that Congress 
would be so empowered. 39 
37 Id. at 168 (emphasis added). 
38 This is part of the view propounded by Professor Akhil Reed Amar in his article A Neo­
Federalist View of Article III· Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. 
REV. 205, 240 (1985) ("The implication of the text, while perhaps not unambiguous, is 
strong: although the judicial power must extend to all cases in the first three categories, it 
may, but need not, extend to all cases in the last six."). 
39 This is exactly the approach taken by defenders of Article III who sought to ease 
concerns regarding the scope of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction: 
The appellate jurisdiction is, therefore, undoubtedly proper, and would not 
have been objected to if they had not introduced, unfortunately, in this 
clause, the words "both as to law and fact." Though I dread no danger, I 
wish these words had been buried in oblivion. If they had, it would have 
silenced the greatest objections against the section. I will give my free and 
candid sentiments on it. We find them followed by words which remove a 
great deal of doubt-"with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as 
Congress shall make;" so that Congress may make such regulations as they 
may think conducive to the public convenience. 
The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia (June 18, 1788) 
(statement of Edmund Pendleton), reprinted in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 1, 
519; see also id. at 534 (statement of James Madison) ("The principal criticism which has 
.been made, was against the appellate cognizance as well of fact as law . . . .  [I]f gentlemen 
should contend that appeals, as to fact, can be extended to jury cases, I contend that, by the 
word regulations, it is in the power of Congress to prevent it, or prescribe such a mode as 
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Perhaps the strongest affirmation of the idea that state 
convention delegates read the Constitution to vest in the inferior 
federal courts full jurisdiction over all the matters enumerated in 
Section 2 of Article III comes from George Mason of Virginia. In 
the Virginia Convention debates, he made the following remarks: 
The inferior courts are to be as numerous as Congress 
may think proper. They are to be of whatever nature 
they please. Read [Section 2 of Article III], and 
contemplate attentively the extent of the jurisdiction of 
these courts, and consider if there be any limits to it. 
I am greatly mistaken if there be any limitation 
whatsoever, with respect to the nature or jurisdiction 
of these courts. If there be any limits, they must be 
contained in one of the clauses of this section; and I 
believe, on a dispassionate discussion, it will be found 
that there is none of any check.40 
Mason certainly was not under the impression that Congress had 
the authority to limit the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts 
to a subset of those matters set forth in Section 2. To the contrary, 
upon reading the document he stated that "there is none of any 
check" on their jurisdiction. Fellow Virginia Convention delegate 
John Tyler seemed to concur somewhat with Mason's 
understanding when he stated, "Is there any limitation of, or 
restriction on, the federal judicial power? I think not."41 
Ultimately, the Virginia Convention addressed its concerns with 
the jurisdiction of the inferior courts by proposing an amendment 
to Article III that would have eliminated the inferior federal courts 
will secure the privilege of jury trial. They may make a regulation to prevent such appeals 
entirely . . . .  "). 
40 Id. at 521 (emphasis added); see also id. at 523 (statement of George Mason) ("I say 
that the general description of the judiciary involves the most extensive jurisdiction. Its 
cognizance, in all cases arising under the system and the laws of Congress, may be said to 
be unlimited."). 
41 Id. at 638-39; see also id. at 565 (statement of William Grayson) (''My next objection to 
the federal judiciary is, that it is not expressed in a definite manner. The jurisdiction of all 
cases arising under the Constitution and the laws of the Union is of stupendous 
magnitude."). 
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and replaced them with admiralty courts. 42 Again, there must 
have been some sentiment that Article III vested the inferior 
federal courts with cognizance of all matters enumerated in 
Section 2-with no available check by Congress-if the delegates 
were so moved to abolish all but their admiralty jurisdiction by 
amendment. 
Besides the central issue of the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts, the provisions of the Constitution that created and 
bolstered the independence of the Federal Judiciary from the other 
branches of the national government were a frequent point of 
reference among those pondering the Constitution in the various 
state conventions.43 In Connecticut, Oliver Ellsworth-himself a 
delegate to the Federal Convention44-remarked, 
This Constitution defines the extent of the powers of 
the general government. If the general legislature 
should at any time overleap their limits, the judicial 
department is a constitutional check. If the United 
States go beyond their powers, if they make a law 
which the Constitution does not authorize, it is void; 
and the judicial power, the national judges, who, to 
secure their impartiality, are to be made independent, 
will declare it to be void. On the other hand, if the 
states go beyond their limits, if they make a law which 
is a usurpation upon the general government, the law 
42 Id. at 660 ("[T]he judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme 
Court, and in such courts of admiralty as Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish in any of the different states."). 
43 See, e.g., Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Feb. 4, 
1788) (statement of Rev. Thomas Thacher), reprinted in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, 
at 1, 145 (''The independence of judges is one of the most favorable circumstances to public 
liberty; for when they become the slaves of a venal, corrupt court, and the hirelings of 
tyranny, all property is precarious, and personal security at an end; a man may be stripped 
of all his possessions, and murdered, without the forms of law."); The Debates in the 
Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia (June 12, 1788) (remarks of Edmund 
Pendleton), reprinted in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 1, 303 (''Whenever, in any 
country in the world, the judges are independent, property is secure."). 
44 Ellsworth also served as the third Chief Justice of the United States. KENNETH 
BERNARD UMBREIT, OUR ELEVEN CHIEF JUSTICES, at vii (1938). 
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is void; and upright, independent judges will declare it 
to be so.45 
23 
The need to have a dispersion and balancing of power within the 
national government was also an important theme for state 
convention delegates.46 James Wilson of Pennsylvania articulated 
the importance of the separation of powers by contrasting it with 
the complete consolidation of authority that characterized the 
Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation: 
Is the Senate, under the proposed Constitution, so 
tremendous a body, when checked in their legislative 
capacity by the House of Representatives, and in their 
executive authority by the President of the United 
States? Can this body be so tremendous as the present 
Congress, a single body of men, possessed of 
legislative, executive, and judicial powers? To what 
purpose was Montesquieu read to show that this was a 
complete tyranny? The application would have been 
more properly made, by the advocates of the proposed 
Constitution, against the patrons of the present 
Confederation. 47 
In the Virginia Convention, Governor Edmund Randolph­
another former delegate to the Federal Convention--0ffered a 
similar refrain when he stated, 
45 Fragment of the Debates in the Convention of the State of Connecticut (Jan. 7, 1788), 
reprinted in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 185, 196. 
46 See id. at 198 (statement of Gov. Samuel Huntingdon) ("[I]f the government be 
properly balanced, it will possess a renovating principle, by which it will be able to right 
itself."); The Debates in the Convention of the State of New York (June 17, 1788) (remarks 
of Robert Livingston), reprinted in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 205, 215 ("[I]f [the 
federal government] was to enjoy legislative, judicial, and executive powers, an attention as 
well to the facility of doing business as to the principles of freedom, called for a division of 
those powers."); The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania (Dec. 4, 1787) 
(statement of James Wilson), reprinted in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 415, 479 ("I 
shall mention another good quality belonging to this system. In it the legislative, executive, 
and judicial powers are kept nearly independent and distinct."). 
47 The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania (Dec. 4, 1787), reprinted in 
2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 459. 
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Are we not taught by reason, experience, and 
governmental history, that tyranny is the natural and 
certain consequence of uniting these two powers, or 
the legislative and judicial powers, exclusively, in the 
same body? . . . Whenever any two of these three 
powers are vested in one single body, they must, at one 
time or other, terminate in the destruction of liberty.48 
As seen in the following review of the defense of the Constitution 
offered in The Federalist, these themes of judicial independence 
and separation of powers continued to hold center stage in the 
discussion of the Judiciary. 
C. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 
Mining the passages within The Federalist for support for 
constitutional arguments has long been the favorite pastime of 
many a constitutional law scholar and member of the Court.49 The 
shortcomings of using The Federalist as proof of any particular 
interpretation of the Constitution are well-known. In a nutshell, 
the argument is that the essays of The Federalist were advocacy 
pieces50 written principally by two individuals-James Madison 
and Alexander Hamilton51-and, therefore, it is not wholly 
legitimate to permit their explanation of text and meaning to 
prevail over the understanding derived directly from the text itself 
48 The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia (June 16, 1788), 
reprinted in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 1, 83. 
49 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 971 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("In 
deciding these cases, . . .  it is The Federalist that finally determines my position. I believe 
that the most straightforward reading of No. 27 is authority for the Government's position 
here, and that this reading is both supported by No. 44 and consistent with Nos. 36 and 
45. "). See generally Melvyn R. Durchslag, The Supreme Court and the Federalist Papers: Is 
There Less Here than Meets the Eye?, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 243 (2005) (discussing 
the Court's use of The Federalist to interpret the Constitution and decide cases). 
50 See Meltzer, supra note 5, at 1581-82 ("The Federalist Papers were, of course, political 
debate, not constitutional exegesis. "). 
61 See James G. Wilson, The Most Sacred Text: The Supreme Court's Use of The 
Federalist Papers, 1985 BYU L. REV. 65, 65 n.2 (attributing only five of the total eighty-five 
essays to John Jay). 
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or from the records of debates of those who considered and voted 
on the Constitution.52 
That said, these writings are of immense value in that they give 
analytical structure to arguments and sentiments espoused by the 
Framers during the debates. They also serve as confirmation that 
various threads of thought that one might discern from consulting 
the Convention debates were indeed on the Framers' minds when 
they crafted and pondered the constitutional text. To the extent 
that these writings were read by people at the time, they also 
reveal what the public at large may have understood to be the 
purpose and meaning of various constitutional provisions. 53 In 
sum, the writings of Hamilton and Madison are indispensable aids 
for understanding the mind of the Convention and the original 
understanding of those who ultimately passed judgment on the 
Constitution's text. 
Turning to the essays of the The Federalist, what do they tell us 
about the Judicial Power that relates to our current topic? · Much 
discussion respecting the Judiciary in The Federalist comes in the 
context of explanation and defense of the separation of powers 
scheme that emerged from the Convention. For Madison, the 
driving motivator behind every aspect of the composition and 
empowerment of each branch of the federal government was the 
desire to avoid tyranny and governmental excess: 
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, 
and judiciary, in the same hands . . .  may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the 
federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with 
this accumulation of power, or with a mixture of 
powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an 
accumulation, no further arguments would be 
62 For discussion of the use of The Federalist, see generally John F. Manning, Textualism 
and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337 
(1998); Wilson, supra note 51. 
63 See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to The Federalist Papers as a Source of the 
Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801, 823 (2007) 
(explaining the theoretical bases for citing The Federalist as evidence of original public 
meaning). 
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necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the 
system.54 
So the concentration of executive, legislative, and judicial powers 
in the same hands was viewed as "the very definition" of tyranny. 
Hamilton later explained the connection between an accumulation 
of power and tyranny when he argued for the independence of the 
Judiciary thusly: 
The complete independence of the courts of justice is 
peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a 
limited Constitution, I understand one which contains 
certain specified exceptions to the legislative 
authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no 
bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. 
Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no 
other way than through the medium of courts of 
justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts 
contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. 
Without this, all the reservations of particular rights 
or privileges would amount to nothing. 55 
Absent a robust and independent Judiciary, there would be no 
means of protecting the rights of the people, and the reservation of 
those rights would become meaningless. How then was one to 
avoid this dreaded accumulation of power? 
According to Madison, the very separation of power into three 
branches and then controlling the ability of one branch to 
dominate the others was critical to forestalling the tyranny that 
results from a concentration of power: 
It is agreed on all sides that the powers properly 
belonging to one of the departments ought not to be 
directly and completely administered by either of the 
other departments. It is equally evident, that none of 
54 THE FEDERALIST No. 4 7 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 271. 
55 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 451. 
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them ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an 
overruling influence over the others in the 
administration of their respective powers. It will not 
be denied that power is of an encroaching nature and 
that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing 
the limits assigned to it.56 
27 
Although the need to delimit the precise boundaries of authority 
among the branches was acknowledged as a necessary step in 
protecting against a tyrannical regime, Madison-writing in The 
Federalist No. 48-ultimately deemed such a step to be woefully 
insufficient: 
Will it be sufficient to mark, with prec1s1on, the 
boundaries of these departments in the constitution of 
the government, and to trust to these parchment 
barriers against the encroaching spirit of 
power? . . . [E]xperience assures us that the efficacy of 
[that approach] has been greatly overrated; and that 
some more adequate defense is indispensably 
necessary for the more feeble against the more 
powerful members of the government. The legislative 
department is everywhere extending the sphere of its 
activity and drawing all power into its impetuous 
vortex.57 
In other words, articulating the limits of departmental power 
would not suffice because the natural strength of the Legislature 
in a republic is such that it will inevitably intrude upon the 
spheres and prerogatives of the other two branches. 58 
Indeed, Hamilton contrasted the strength of the Legislature 
with the weakness and vulnerability of the Judiciary. Hamilton 
said it best when he wrote, 
56 THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 279. 
51 Id. 
58 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 294 ("In republican 
government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates."). 
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[T]he judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will 
always be the least dangerous to the political rights of 
the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity 
to annoy or injure them . . . .  The judiciary . . .  has no 
influence over either the sword or the purse; no 
direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the 
society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It 
may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but 
merely judgment . . . .  
This simple view of the matter suggests several 
important consequences. It proves incontestably that 
the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the 
three departments of power; that it can never attack 
with success either of the other two; and that all 
possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself 
against their attacks.59 
Such vulnerability demanded special efforts to protect the 
Judiciary; otherwise, the inevitably stronger Legislature would 
exploit its "natural feebleness."60 
What then would be the means of constraining the authority of 
the three branches, particularly the Legislative Branch? Madison 
asked and answered this question at the beginning of The 
Federalist No. 51 : 
To what expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for 
maintaining in practice the necessary partition of 
power among the several departments as laid down in 
the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is 
that as all these exterior provisions are found to be 
inadequate the defect must be supplied, by so 
contriving the interior structure of the government as 
that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual 
59 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 450 (emphasis added) 
(footnote omitted). 
60 Id. ("[F]rom the natural feebleness of the judiciary, it is in continual jeopardy of being 
overpowered, awed, or influenced by its co-ordinate branches . . . .  "). 
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relations, be the means of keeping each other in their 
proper places. 
But the great security against a gradual 
concentration of the several powers in the same 
department consists in giving to those who administer 
each department the necessary constitutional means . 
and personal motives to resist encroachments of the 
others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all 
other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of 
attack.61 
29 
Thus, we see a threefold approach emerge: each of the three 
branches was to be designed in a manner that would permit them 
to exercise their vested authority independently; each required 
some ability to check the behavior of any wayward branch; and the 
separate departments were to be given the means of protecting 
themselves against encroachments by the other departments. 
How was this approach translated into specifics? Focusing on 
the Judicial Branch-the concern here-Madison indicated that 
because members of the Judiciary would be dependent upon the 
other branches for their appointment, there was a need to 
neutralize that dependency through other measures bolstering 
judicial independence. The two measures he alluded to were the 
life-tenured status of the judges once appointed62 and their 
protection against diminution in pay.63 However, one could easily 
take the logic of his point to articulate a defense of the need for 
other strong measures to keep the Judiciary separate and 
independent from the other branches. 
61 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 293-94 (emphasis omitted). 
62 See id. at 293 ("[T]he permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that 
department must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them."). 
63 See id. at 294 ("It is equally evident that the members of each department should be as 
little dependent as possible on those of the others for the emoluments annexed to their 
offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in 
this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal."). 
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Hamilton expounded on this point in The Federalist No. 78. 
Remarking on the innovation of life tenure for federal judges, 
Hamilton wrote, 
The standard of good behavior for the continuance in 
office of the judicial magistracy is certainly one of the 
most valuable of the modern improvements in the 
practice of government. In a monarchy it is an 
excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a 
republic it is a no less excellent barrier to the 
encroachments and oppressions of the representative 
body. And it is the best expedient which can be 
devised in any government to secure a steady, upright, 
and impartial administration of the laws . . . .  
. . . [A]s nothing can contribute so much to its 
firmness and independence as permanency in office, 
this quality may therefore be justly regarded as an 
indispensable ingredient in its constitution, and, in a 
great measure, as the citadel of the public justice and 
the public security. 64 
Hamilton also explained the importance of the guarantee against a 
diminution in judicial pay by stating, 
Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute 
more to the independence of the judges than a fixed 
provision for their support. . . . In the general course 
of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence 
amounts to a power over his will. And we can never 
hope to see realized in practice the complete 
separation of the judicial from the legislative power, in 
64 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 449-50; see also id. at 
453 (''If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited 
Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong 
argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much 
as this to that independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful 
performance of so arduous a duty."). 
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any system which leaves the former dependent for 
pecumary resources on the occasional grants of the 
latter.65 
31 
Clearly, then, the independence and potency of the Judiciary were 
of paramount importance; the Founders thus constituted the 
Judicial Branch to preserve those principles. 
The founding vision of judicial independence and potency was 
not left dependent solely upon the provision for life tenure and 
salary protection. The scope of the Judiciary's authority was also 
critical in this regard. As Hamilton explained, the Judiciary 
needed to have authority that was "coextensive" with the scope of 
federal legislative authority and competent to "giv[e] efficacy to 
constitutional provisions."66 Thus, he regarded it imperative that 
the judicial authority extended to "all" of several classes of cases: 
[First], to all those which arise out of the laws of the 
United States, passed in pursuance of their just and 
constitutional powers of legislation; [second], to all 
those which concern the execution of the provisions 
expressly contained in the articles of Union; [third], to 
all those in which the United States are a party; 
[fourth], to all those which involve the peace of the 
confederacy, whether they relate to the intercourse 
between the United States and foreign nations or to 
that between the States themselves; [fifth], to all those 
which originate on the high seas, and are of admiralty 
or maritime jurisdiction; and lastly, to all those in 
which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be 
impartial and unbiased. 67 
By extending to all such matters, the Judiciary would be fully 
competent to address all matters that the Legislature could touch, 
65 THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 457 (emphasis 
omitted). 
66 THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 461-62. 
67 Id. at 461 (emphasis omitted). 
32 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46: 1 
a critical element in setting up the federal courts as a bulwark 
against legislative excess. Similarly, cognizance of constitutional 
questions would permit the Judiciary to protect the rights of the 
people against encroachments by the other branches or by the 
states.68 
It is worth noting that at the end of The Federalist No. 80, 
Hamilton makes the following statement: 
From this review of the particular powers of the 
federal judiciary, as marked out in the Constitution, it 
appears that they are all conformable to the principles 
which ought to have governed the structure of that 
department and which were necessary to the 
perfection of the system. If some partial 
inconveniences should appear to be connected with the 
incorporation of any of them into the plan it ought to 
be recollected that the national legislature will have 
ample authority to make such exceptions and to 
prescribe such regulations as will be calculated to 
obviate or remove these inconveniences.69 
Is Hamilton here endorsing the notion that the Constitution 
permits the Legislature to remove some portion of the cases and 
controversies falling within the Judicial Power from the 
cognizance of the federal courts? Although such a reading of 
Hamilton's words is possible-even plausible-it is at least equally 
plausible to limit the reference to Congress's authority to curtail 
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Hamilton's 
wording indicates that the latter is the better reading: the 
68 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 453 ("[T]he courts 
of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative 
encroachments . . . . "); THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 461 
("The States, by the plan of the convention, are prohibited from doing a variety of things, 
some of which are incompatible with the interests of the Union and others with the 
principles of good government. . . . No man of sense will believe that such prohibitions 
would be scrupulously regarded without some effectual power in the government to restrain 
or correct the infractions of them."). 
69 THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 466 (emphasis added). 
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Legislature will have the authority "to make such exceptions and 
to prescribe such regulations" as will obviate or remove any 
inconveniences. This language closely tracks Article III, Section 2, 
Clause 2: 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State 
shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original 
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, 
the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, 
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and 
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.70 
Hamilton likely had the text of the Constitution clutched 
immediately in his hand when he wrote his words given that he 
had just quoted extensively from the previous clause of Section 2 
in the same essay.71 That he was loosely quoting from Clause 2 
here is thus all the more probable. That said, it is not disputed 
that the constitutional language only confers upon Congress power 
over the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, not the inferior federal 
courts. Thus, if Hamilton was referring to the passage as a source 
of congressional authority to limit the jurisdiction of all federal 
courts, he clearly misunderstood it; his statement cannot 
transform the Clause into congressional authority that it 
indisputably does not confer. 
In sum, the essays of The Federalist reveal at least some of the 
Framers' and the public's understanding of Article III as being 
extremely protective of the independence of the Judicial Branch. 
Although the Constitution's promise of lifetime tenure and salary 
protection for judges certainly reflects this independence, reading 
the Constitution as furthering and protecting that independence 
through direct vesting of the Judicial Power in the inferior federal 
courts is also consistent with this vision of judicial independence, 
given the need for judicial authority to be coextensive with the 
70 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
71 See THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 465-66 (quoting 
and paraphrasing the language of Article III, Section 2, Clause 1). 
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scope of legislative authority. Thus, although one fails to find a 
direct endorsement of the constitutional vesting thesis among the 
pages of The Federalist, one sees no rejection of it either, and one 
certainly can imagine such vesting being consistent with the 
Framers' desired level of independence for the federal courts. 
* * * * *  
The relevant contemporary evidence of the public debate 
surrounding the development and adoption of the Constitution 
reveals a clear theme with respect to the Judicial Department of 
the newly created federal government: Separation of powers in the 
service of judicial independence and judicial independence as a 
backstop against tyranny. Far from being a matter of mere form­
or simply fodder for political rhetoric-the issue of separation of 
powers and its concomitant concept of checks and balances resided 
at the core of the plan of the Convention. 72 Having revolted 
against and overthrown a tyrannical regime that ruled from afar, 
the new Americans were dedicated to devising a government that 
would not be able to so dominate them from within. The means 
identified for achieving this end was to divide power among 
various departments, to set each one up as independent from the 
other, and to vest each of them with some means of checking their 
fellows.73 
72 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 450 ("[T]here 
is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive 
powers." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); The Debates in the 
Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia (June 24, 1788) (statement of John Dawson), 
reprinted in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 1, 608 (''That the legislative, executive, 
and judicial powers should be separate and distinct, in all free governments, is a political 
fact so well established, that I presume I shall not be thought arrogant, when I affirm that 
no country ever did, or ever can, long remain free, where they are blended."). 
73 See Rayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 (1792) (attached circuit court opinion by 
Jay, C.J., Cushing, J., and Duane, D.J.) (''That by the Constitution of the United States, the 
government thereof is divided into three distinct and independent branches, and that it is 
the duty of each to abstain from, and to oppose, encroachments on either." (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); id. at 411 (letter of Wilson and Blair, JJ., and Peters, D.J.) ("It is 
a principle important to freedom, that in government, the judicial should be distinct from, 
and independent of, the legislative department. To this important principle the people of 
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Achieving this balance was a tricky matter. The Framers first 
had to agree on what powers the national government as a whole 
would have and then they had to decide to which department to 
assign such powers. Although the assignment process in the 
aggregate was a simple matter of assigning legislative, executive, 
and judicial powers to the respective branches of Congress, the 
President, and the Supreme Court and inferior federal courts, it 
was on the margins where difficult decisions affecting the balance 
of power between the three branches had to be made. For 
example, would the trial of impeachments-clearly a judicial 
power-be placed within the Judicial Branch or would that matter 
be better handled by another department?74 Should the 
warmaking power-a seeming executive power traditionally 
exercised by a country's head of state-lay exclusively in the hands 
of our President or should such capability be dispersed?75 Deciding 
these matters one way or the other was what the game was all 
about; going in either direction would substantially alter the 
delicate balance the Framers were attempting to strike. 
Given what rested on these decisions at the margins, one is 
obligated to honor the decisions made and take seriously the 
allocations of power on which the Framers settled. In the next 
Part, the Article will consider how Congress and the Court have 
understood the nature of this allocation with respect to the 
Judicial Power, leaving to Part IV an examination of whether this 
traditional understanding is fully consonant with the text, 
structure, and history surrounding the Constitution's relevant 
texts. 
the United States, in forming their Constitution, have manifested the highest regard. They 
have placed their judicial power not in congress, but in courts."). 
74 This matter was ultimately resolved in favor of assigning the trial of impeachments to 
the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all 
Impeachments."). 
76 Dispersion of the warmaking power was achieved by giving Congress the power to 
declare war, id .. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 1, but making the President the Commander in Chief of the 
military forces, id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 .  
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III. THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL POWER 
The traditional view of the Judicial Power consists of the 
understanding that the courts have the exclusive authority to 
decide cases and controversies of the kind enumerated in Article 
III, with no role in the dispute resolution process being reserved 
for the Executive or Congress. 76 Thus, neither the Executive 
Branch77 nor Congress78 may attempt review of the decisions of 
Article III courts. Notwithstanding this exclusive judicial 
authority, it is generally felt that Congress can manipulate the 
class of cases over which the inferior Article III courts will have 
cognizance. 79 
As discussed, the plan of the Convention was for the Judiciary 
Branch to be, as near as possible, free from manipulation by the 
other two branches to facilitate the untainted exercise of its vested 
judicial authority. However, from the very beginning of the 
Republic, Congress has asserted-and the Supreme Court has 
acquiesced in-the power to withhold some portion of the Judicial 
Power of the United States vested in the inferior federal courts 
under Article III. The development and acceptance of this 
congressional incursion into the judicial sphere will be reviewed 
below. 
76 Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 342 (2000) ("Article III 'gives the Federal Judiciary the 
power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them, subject to review only by superior 
courts in the Article III hierarchy.' " (quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 
218-19 (1995))). 
77 Plaut, 614 U.S. at 218 ("Congress cannot vest review of the decisions of Article III 
courts in officials of the Executive Branch." (citing Rayburn 's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409)). 
78 Id. at 226 (" '[N]o decision of any court of the United States can, under any 
circumstances, . . .  be liable to a revision, or even suspension, by the [l]egislature itself, in 
whom no judicial power of any kind appears to be vested.' " (alterations in original) (quoting 
Rayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 413 (letter of Iredell, J., and Sitgreaves, D.J.))). 
79 See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 9, at 912-14 (summarizing the traditional view); Bator, 
supra note 6, at 1030-31 ("[Article III] leaves it to Congress to decide, having created lower 
federal courts, what their jurisdiction should be-that is, to decide which of the cases to 
which the federal judicial power extends should be litigated in the lower federal courts."). 
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A. THE UNDERSTANDING OF CONGRESS 
Congress has always asserted the right to limit the jurisdiction 
of the inferior federal courts.80 It was the First Congress that 
initially created a collection of inferior federal courts in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789.81 Beyond constituting these courts, the 
Judiciary Act also provided in detail for their jurisdiction. 
Regarding the district courts, the Act indicated that certain 
matters were within their jurisdiction to the exclusion of the state 
courts: minor crimes82 cognizable under the authority of the 
United States, civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, 
matters involving seizures on land or other waters under the laws 
of the United States, and suits against consuls or vice-consuls.83 
The same section of the Act then indicated that district courts 
would have "concurrent" jurisdiction over causes where an alien 
sues for a tort in violation of the law of nations or a U.S. treaty 
and all suits at common law by the United States valued of at least 
one hundred dollars. 84 The Act assigned the circuit courts 
concurrent jurisdiction over: 
60 That Congress may limit the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is not in 
question. Article III provides: 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, 
and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have 
original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme 
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such 
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has affirmed 
Congress's authority in this regard. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 
(1868) ("[W]hile 'the appellate powers of this court are not given by the judicial act, but are 
given by the Constitution,' they are, nevertheless, 'limited and regulated by that act, and by 
such other acts as have been passed on the subject.' " (quoting Durousseau v. United States, 
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810))). Although the power of Congress to regulate the 
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is universally acknowledged, the scope of that 
authority has been the subject of debate. See Gunther, supra note 9, at 901--08 (describing 
the narrow view of Congress's power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court). 
81 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 2-3, 1 Stat. 73-74 (establishing the first district 
courts). 
82 The Act defined minor crimes as those subject to punishments not exceeding one 
hundred dollars of fines, six months of prison, or thirty lashes of the whip. Id. § 9. 
8a Id. 
84 Id. 
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all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, 
where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, 
the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the 
United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien 
is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State 
where the suit is brought and a citizen of another 
State.85 
The Act gave the circuit courts exclusive jurisdiction over crimes 
"cognizable under the authority of the United States," except that 
jurisdiction over minor crimes was to be concurrent with the 
district courts that were located where such crimes occurred. 86 
Congress also gave the circuit courts appellate jurisdiction over 
matters coming from the district courts.87 However, the Act 
conferred no general federal question jurisdiction on the circuit or 
district courts.88 Thus, for both the district courts and the circuit 
courts, Congress delineated the scope of their jurisdiction and 
provided that such jurisdiction would extend only to a subset of 
the cases and controversies described in Article III as comprising 
the Judicial Power of the United States. 
Debate over the Judiciary Act of 1789 embraced both 
consideration of the desirability of limiting federal court 
jurisdiction and of Congress's authority to do so.89 However, many 
85 Id. § 11. 
86 Id. 
81 Id. 
88 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 8, at 320 (''The first Judiciary Act did not provide for 
general federal question jurisdiction in civil cases . . . . Federal question cases that did not 
fall into some more specialized grant of jurisdiction had to be litigated in state court, subject 
to Supreme Court review."). 
89 See Warren, supra note 9, at 67 (''This was the crucial contest in the enactment of the 
Judiciary Act. The broad pro-Constitution men took the position that Congress had no 
power to withhold from the Federal Courts which it should establish any of the judicial 
power granted by the Constitution."). Indeed, Warren's useful research reveals that the 
effort to reduce federal jurisdiction to a subset of the Article III Judicial Power was the 
product of an effort on the part of some to undermine the broad grant of Article III in favor 
of limited jurisdiction that trenched less upon the authority and dignity of the states. See 
id. at 53 (''The fact is that the final form of the Act . . .  was a compromise measure, so 
framed as to secure the votes of those who, while willing to see the experiment of a Federal 
Constitution tried, were insistent that the Federal Courts should be given the minimum 
powers and jurisdiction."). 
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members seemed to suppose that such authority existed and 
focused their energy on determining the precise scope of the 
prospective limits. A statement by Congressman William Smith of 
South Carolina is illustrative of the presumption of many that 
Congress could control inferior court jurisdiction. During the 
debate over whether to approve the proposed Judiciary Act, Smith 
indicated that after the House determined whether to create a 
system of inferior federal courts, "the next [point] which occurs is 
the extent of jurisdiction to be annexed to this court . . . .  [S]ome 
gentlemen are of opinion that the district court should be 
altogether confined to admiralty causes; while others deem it 
expedient that it should be entrusted with a more enlarged 
jurisdiction."90 
Indeed, a major point of contention among members of the 
House was whether the competency of the inferior federal courts 
should be limited solely to admiralty jurisdiction. 91 The ultimate 
limits decided upon were much broader than admiralty 
jurisdiction, but the more important point for our purposes is that 
the members of the First Congress clearly affirmed congressional 
authority to impose jurisdictional limits on the inferior federal 
courts when they enacted the final version of the Judiciary Act. 
One member of the House of Representatives in particular 
spoke forcefully in favor of congressional authority to shape and 
limit the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts. Here is an 
extended excerpt of a speech on the topic by Congressman Michael 
Stone during the debates on the Judiciary Act: 
It appears from the words of the constitution, that 
Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish 
inferior courts, such as they think proper: Now, if this 
90 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 828 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); see also id. at 848 (statement 
of Rep. William Smith) ("The objection to the extent of jurisdiction is premature, and ought 
to be reserved for the clause which ascertains the jurisdiction; if, upon an investigation of 
that clause, it should appear that it ought to be restricted, that would be the seasonable 
time for moving to strike out the exceptionable part."). 
91 See id. at 827 (statement of Rep. Samuel Livermore) ("Now, if we have a Supreme 
Court, to which appeals can be carried, and an Admiralty Court for deciding cases of a 
maritime nature, our system will be useful and complete."). 
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is a command for us to establish inferior courts, if we 
cannot model or restrain their jurisdictions, the words 
which give us the power from time to time so to do, are 
vain and nugatory. . . . [T]he words ordain and 
establish will not only go to the appointment of Judges 
of inferior courts, but they comprehend every thing 
which relates to them . . . .  It is not said in that 
instrument, that you shall exercise the judicial power 
over all those cases, but that the judicial power shall 
extend to those cases. If it had been the idea of the 
convention that its Judiciary should extend so as 
positively to have taken in all these cases, they would 
have so declared it, and been explicit; but they have 
given you a power to extend your jurisdiction to them, 
but have not compelled you that extension.92 
This statement is one of the clearest made by those debating the 
Act in favor of congressional authority over inferior court 
jurisdiction. 
Was Stone correct in his argument that congressional authority 
over the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts arose from the power 
to "ordain and establish" such courts? Stone clearly conflates the 
distinct issues of (1) whether Congress must create inferior federal 
courts and (2) whether, once created, jurisdiction over the full 
range of cases and controversies that comprise the Judicial Power 
must be vested in such courts. Only the latter of the two points is 
at issue here, and in supporting the latter point, Stone makes a 
linguistic argument. He attempts to draw a distinction between 
the existing language of Article III-that the Judicial Power "shall 
extend" to certain cases-and what it otherwise might have said­
that "you shall exercise the Judicial Power over all those cases." 
That the Framers did not employ the latter formulation is taken as 
evidence of their intent to leave the scope of inferior court 
jurisdiction to Congress. 
92 Id. at 854-55. 
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This wordplay should not be confused for sound argument. The 
term "extend" is used in Article III because it is used to describe 
the concept "Judicial Power." It would be improper to say "the 
Judicial Power shall exercise all cases . . .  " because that is not 
something that Judicial Power can do. To make the sentence 
proper using the term "exercise," the sentence would have to read 
"the Judicial Power shall be exercised in all cases." But then the 
sentence would no longer describe the nature and scope of the 
Judicial Power; rather, it would describe what the courts are 
supposed to do. In other words, the latter formulation would focus 
on what the courts must do (exercise the Judicial Power in certain 
cases) as opposed to focusing on explaining exactly what the 
Judicial Power is (the Judicial Power extends to the enumerated 
cases and controversies). But that is not the office of the first 
sentence of Section 2; that clause describes the scope of the 
Judicial Power. It is for Section 1 to vest that power in the 
relevant components of the federal government-the Supreme 
Court and any created inferior courts. Given the role of Section 2 
as the definer of the Judicial Power, the Framers' word choice not 
only makes sense, but is likely the clearest way that they could 
have imparted an imperative meaning for the term. 
Another observation will complete the refutation of Stone's 
thesis. As noted above, the previous version of the Judiciary 
Article considered by the Framers in the Convention used the 
following language: "[t]he Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall 
extend to all cases."93 The Framers amended this language by 
substituting "the Judicial power" in the place of "The jurisdiction 
of the supreme Court."94 Certainly, Stone would have no warrant 
for asserting that the previous language, that "[t]he Jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court shall extend to all cases" would have been 
insufficiently imperative regarding the scope of the Court's 
jurisdiction simply because the Framers failed to say "The 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall be exercised in all 
cases . . . .  " What other way could one craft a sentence to describe 
the scope of the Court's jurisdiction than saying it "shall extend to 
93 Session of Monday, August 6, 1787, supra note 15, at 344. 
94 Session of Monday, August 27, 1787, supra note 16, at 475. 
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all cases" of a particular kind? Similarly, claiming that the 
substituted language that one now finds in Article III does not do 
the job is simply untenable; the Framers agreed and stated that 
the Judicial Power "shall extend" to certain enumerated cases and 
controversies. 
B. THE VIEW OF THE COURT 
From the beginning, the Supreme Court has also consistently 
endorsed the notion that Congress has the authority to limit the 
jurisdiction of inferior federal courts.95 Although an advocate in 
Turner v. Bank of North America96 raised early on the idea that 
Congress had no authority to vary the jurisdiction of inferior 
federal courts from the class of cases and controversies in Section 2 
of Article III, the Court rejected the argument. In that case, 
counsel for the appellee-who was attempting to defend the 
jurisdiction of a circuit court over a commercial paper dispute 
based on diversity-argued, 
[T]he judicial power, is the grant of the constitution; 
and congress can no more limit, than enlarge, the 
constitutional grant . . . .  By the opposite construction, 
however, congress has imposed a limitation upon the 
judicial power, not warranted by the constitution, 
when, without regard to the immediate parties to the 
controversy, the law excepts from the cognizance of the 
federal Courts, suits upon promissory notes, which, by 
assignment, have placed the immediate parties, in the 
relation of citizens of different states.97 
95 See, e.g. ,  Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1973) ("Article III describes 
the judicial power as extending to all cases, among others, arising under the laws of the 
United States; but, aside from this Court, the power is vested 'in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.' The decision with respect to inferior 
federal courts, as well as the task of defining their jurisdiction, was left to the discretion of 
Congress." (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1)). 
96 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799). 
97 Id. at 10. 
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To this argument Chief Justice Ellsworth98 responded, "How far 
is it meant to carry this argument? Will it be affirmed, that in 
every case, to which the judicial power of the United States 
extends, the federal Courts may exercise a jurisdiction, without 
the intervention of the legislature, to distribute, and regulate, the 
power?"99 Justice Chase expressly rejected the idea: 
The notion has frequently been entertained, that the 
federal Courts derive their judicial power immediately 
from the constitution; but the political truth is, that 
the disposal of the judicial power, (except in a few 
specified instances) belongs to congress. If congress 
has given the power to this Court, we possess it, not 
otherwise: and if congress has not given the power to 
us, or to any other Court, it still remains at the 
legislative disposal. Besides, congress is not bound, 
and it would, perhaps, be inexpedient, to enlarge the 
jurisdiction of the federal Courts, to every subject, in 
every form, which the constitution might warrant. 100 
The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the understanding 
of Justice Chase on the matter when it offered the following 
definitive statements in United States v. Hudson:101 
Of all the Courts which the United States may, under 
their general powers, constitute, one only, the 
Supreme Court, possesses jurisdiction derived 
immediately from the constitution, and of which the 
legislative power cannot deprive it. All other Courts 
created by the general Government possess no 
98 Recall that Chief Justice Ellsworth was himself a delegate to the Federal Convention 
and the ratifying Connecticut Convention. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
99 Turner, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 10 n.l. 
100 Id. Note Justice Chase's recognition that an acceptance of congressional authority over 
federal court jurisdiction is a "political'' rather than "constitutional" truth. This may reflect 
the reality that Congress possessed a superior ability to impose its will than did the Court, 
but it also could reflect a sense that such authority over jurisdiction would be exercised for 
political reasons. 
101 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). 
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jurisdiction but what is given them by the power that 
creates them, and can be vested with none but what 
the power ceded to the general Government will 
authorize them to confer . 
. . . [S]uch is the opinion of the majority of this 
Court: For, the power which congress possess [sic] to 
create Courts of inferior jurisdiction, necessarily 
implies the power to limit the jurisdiction of those 
Courts to particular objects . . . .  102 
The famous case of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee103 reaffirmed this 
view, with a minor caveat. In the course of determining whether 
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction extended to the review 
of state court decisions, the Court indicated that Congress did 
have the authority to parcel out jurisdiction among the federal 
courts provided that the whole of the Judicial Power is vested in 
the federal courts collectively. 104 Thus, according to the Martin 
Court, so long as all of the Judicial Power was in the hands of the 
collective of federal courts, how such power was apportioned 
among those courts was for Congress to control. 
A final citation will solidify the point. In Cary v. Curtis105 the 
Court sealed the status of this idea (of congressional power over 
inferior court jurisdiction) as one of unquestionable validity when 
it wrote, 
102 Id. at 33. 
10s 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
104 Id. at 331 ("It would seem, therefore, to follow, that congress are bound to create some 
inferior courts, in which to vest all that jurisdiction which, under the constitution, is 
exclusively vested in the United States, and of which the supreme court cannot take original 
cognizance. They might establish one or more inferior courts; they might parcel out the 
jurisdiction among such courts, from time to time, at their own pleasure. But the whole 
judicial power of the United States should be, at all times, vested either in an original or 
appellate form, in some courts created under its authority."); see also McIntire v. Wood, 1 1  
U.S. ( 7  Cranch) 504, 506 (1813) ("[A]lthough the judicial power of  the United States extends 
to cases arising under the laws of the United States, the legislature have not thought proper 
to delegate the exercise of that power to its Circuit Courts, except in certain specified 
cases."). 
10s 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845). 
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[One of] the doctrine[s] so often ruled in this court [is] 
that the judicial power of the United States, although 
it has its origin in the Constitution, is (except in 
enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to this 
court) dependent for its distribution and organization, 
and for the modes of its exercise, entirely upon the 
action of Congress, who possess the sole power of 
creating the tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court) 
for the exercise of the judicial power, and of investing 
them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or 
exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in 
the exact degrees and character which to Congress 
may seem proper for the public good. To deny this 
position would be to elevate the judicial over the 
legislative branch of the government . . . . 106 
45 
Why the early Court took this view of congressional power over 
jurisdiction-which goes against the interests of the Federal 
Judiciary-is unclear; perhaps restraint in this area at this point 
in the Court's history was wise, as it avoided a direct confrontation 
with Congress that might have encouraged more encroachment on 
the exercise of the Judicial Power. In any event, the Court has 
stood by this view in subsequent cases, each time simply asserting 
(as in previous cases) rather than demonstrating or establishing 
the veracity of the proposition.107 
106 Id. at 245. 
107 See, e.g., Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922) ("The effect of [Article 
III] is not to vest jurisdiction in the inferior courts over the designated cases and 
controversies but to delimit those in respect of which Congress may confer jurisdiction upon 
such courts as it creates. Only the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is derived directly 
from the Constitution. Every other court created by the general government derives its 
jurisdiction wholly from the authority of Congress. That body may give, withhold or restrict 
such jurisdiction at its discretion . . . .  The Constitution simply gives to the inferior courts 
the capacity to take jurisdiction in the enumerated cases, but it requires an act of Congress 
to confer it."); Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U.S. 165, 167 (1904) ("The Supreme Court alone 
'possesses jurisdiction derived immediately from the Constitution, and of which the 
legislative power cannot deprive it,' but the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts depends upon 
some act of Congress." (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) 32, 33 (1812))); The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1867) (''The 
Constitution must have given to the court the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress 
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IV. A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL POWER 
Having reviewed the historical context and the traditional 
views of Congress and the Supreme Court respecting Article III, 
does the traditional view represent an unduly narrow view of the 
Judicial Power that impermissibly cedes to Congress authority 
over the Federal Judiciary that it was not given and that it should 
not have been permitted to take? One might derive from the 
historical record an alternative understanding of Article III-that 
it fully and directly vested the Judicial Power in all federal courts, 
a view that, if correct, would preclude congressional manipulation 
of the jurisdiction of inferior Article III courts once created. I refer 
to this viewpoint as the "constitutional vesting thesis." 
The constitutional vesting thesis-that all federal courts 
(Supreme and inferior) are respectively vested with the Judicial 
Power in full-would mean that once constituted, an Article III 
court constitutionally enjoys cognizance of all classes of cases and 
controversies set forth in Article III. This goes well against the 
prevailing current of thought on the matter throughout this 
country's history. 108 However, even though the Supreme Court's 
embrace of the view that Congress may limit the jurisdiction of 
inferior federal courts is of ancient lineage, the proposition has 
never satisfactorily been established by the Court. 109 At least one 
must have supplied it. Their concurrence is necessary to vest it. It is the duty of Congress 
to act for that purpose up to the limits of the granted power. They may fall short of it, but 
cannot exceed it. To the extent that such action is not taken, the power lies dormant. It can 
be brought into activity in no other way."); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) 
("[l]t would seem to follow, also, that, having a right to prescribe, Congress may withhold 
from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies. Courts 
created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers."). 
10s See supra Part III. 
109 The Court has employed a greater-includes-the-lesser-power line of reasoning to derive 
and defend the notion of congressional control over inferior court jurisdiction. See, e.g., 
Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) ("The Congressional power to ordain and 
establish inferior courts includes the power 'of investing them with jurisdiction either 
limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact 
degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.' "  (quoting 
Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845))). However, such a logical argument is not 
satisfactory in the face of Article Ill's language and drafting history, as will be discussed in 
this Part. See infra notes 125-33 and accompanying text. 
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lower court, a circuit court in Dundas v. Bowler, 110 deigned to 
challenge the received wisdom that the jurisdiction of the inferior 
federal courts is dependent upon a congressional dispensation 
rather than on the Constitution itself: 
That the judicial power shall extend to controversies 
between citizens of different states, is clearly and in 
terms declared in the constitution. Where suit is 
brought by the assignee of a note against the maker, 
who lives in a different state, the case is literally 
within the constitution; and yet the act of congress 
declares the jurisdiction shall depend not alone upon 
the citizenship of the parties on the record, but also 
upon the citizenship of those by whom the note may 
have been negotiated. In so far as this law is 
restrictive of the constitutional right of a non-resident, 
it is, in my judgment, unconstitutional. If congress can 
impose this restriction, they may go farther, and 
impose other restrictions, as their discretion may 
dictate. In this way a constitutional right may be 
modified or taken away in whole or in part, as congress 
may determine. This is a new and most dangerous 
principle, and cannot be maintained. It is too late to 
say that a constitutional right, though explicitly given, 
cannot be carried into effect, except through legislative 
action. No legislation was required, and the only 
inquiry is, whether a legislative act can abrogate the 
right thus given. I am aware that the practice of the 
courts of the United States has been different, and 
that, by frequent decisions, they have sanctioned the 
law; and I am also aware that this has been done 
without inquiry, as to the validity of the act. Its 
constitutionality has not been questioned, and, after so 
many years of acquiescence, it may excite some 
surprise that it is now questioned. Satisfied as I am 
110 8 F. Cas. 28 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 4 140). 
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that the act restrictive of a constitutional right should 
be held void, yet, by the course of decisions made on 
the act under consideration, I cannot rest my decision 
on its unconstitutionality.1 1 1  
The position so well stated above is, in sum, that the Supreme 
Court's embrace of the idea that Congress may manipulate the 
jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts is a position arrived at 
without thorough examination of its constitutionality. 
Sheldon v. Sill1 12 is illustrative of the Court's inadequate 
analytical treatment of this issue. There, the Court directly 
responded to the claim in Dundas that the jurisdiction-limiting 
provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789 were unconstitutional: 
It must be admitted, that if the Constitution had 
ordained and established the inferior courts, and 
distributed to them their respective powers, they could 
not be restricted or divested by Congress. But as it 
has made no such distribution, one of two 
consequences must result[ ]--either that each inferior 
court created by Congress must exercise all the judicial 
powers not given to the Supreme Court, or that 
Congress, having the power to establish the courts, 
must define their respective jurisdictions. The first of 
these inferences has never been asserted, and could 
not be defended with any show of reason, and if not, 
the latter would seem to follow as a necessary 
consequence. And it would seem to follow, also, that, 
having a right to prescribe, Congress may withhold 
from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the 
enumerated controversies. Courts created by statute 
can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute 
confers . . . . 
1 1 1  Id. at 28-29 (emphasis added). 
112 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). 
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Such has been the doctrine held by this court since 
its first establishment. To enumerate all the cases in 
which it has been either directly advanced or tacitly 
assumed would be tedious and unnecessary. 113 
49 
This type of ipse dixit is typical of the Court's treatment of this 
principle, as was seen in the previous discussion of the Court's 
earlier cases. 114 
Can such non-analysis suffice as the foundation for acceptance 
of the doctrine that Congress has unquestioned authority to 
constrain inferior Article III courts' exercise of the Judicial Power? 
Challenges to this idea, as were articulated by counsel in Turner 
and the court in Dundas, 1 15 deserve a much more reasoned 
consideration given the gravity of the question they address and 
the implications of a contrary view. This Article will now turn to 
such a consideration. 
Article III reads, "The judicial Power of the United States, shall 
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."116 From 
this language all should agree that the Constitution vests "[t]he 
judicial Power of the United States" in whatever "inferior Courts" 
Congress may establish, the same Judicial Power that is vested in 
the "one supreme Court." Many have suggested that this language 
vests the Judicial Power in the Federal Judiciary as a whole, a 
view that would permit Congress to partition the Judicial Power 
and to allocate that power among components of the Judiciary as 
Congress sees fit.117 The wording of Section 1, however, challenges 
11a Id. at 448-49. 
114 See supra Part 111.B; see also Cary, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 245 ("This argument is in 
nowise impaired by admitting that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under 
the Constitution and laws of the United States. Perfectly consistent with such an 
admission is the truth, that the organization of the judicial power, the definition and 
distribution of the subjects of jurisdiction in the federal tribunals, and the modes of their 
action and authority, have been, and of right must be, the work of the legislature."). 
115 See supra notes 96-100, 110-11 and accompanying text. 
ns U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
117 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 38, at 231 ("[The] opening words of Article III . . .  establish 
that the judicial power of the United States must be vested in the federal judiciary as a 
whole."). 
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this view. Section l reads: "The judicial Power of the United 
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior 
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish."118 Had the Framers intended a collective vesting, they 
might have written "shall be vested in one supreme Court and 
such inferior Courts as the Congress may'' using the word "in" once 
rather than twice. By using the word "in" two times, Section 1 
directly vests all of the Judicial Power "in one supreme Court" but 
also simultaneously vests the same Judicial Power "in such 
inferior Courts" as Congress chooses to create. Thus, one can at 
least question the apportionment-within-the-judiciary approach 
because it renders nugatory the Section's language indicating that 
the Judicial Power is vested fully "in" the Supreme Court "and in" 
the inferior federal courts. 1 19 
Turning then to what this Judicial Power embraces, Section 2 of 
Article III reveals that this very same power "shall extend": 
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of 
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to 
118 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added). 
119 It is for this reason that I disagree with Clinton's conclusion that the Judicial Power 
must be vested in the Federal Judiciary as a whole. See Clinton, supra note 9, at 749-50 
(explaining his conclusion). I also differ with his interpretation of the Exceptions and 
Regulations Clause as empowering Congress to allocate federal jurisdiction among the 
Supreme and inferior courts. See id. at 793 (reaching "the conclusion that 'exceptions' 
contemplated under the exceptions and regulations clause were at most assignments of 
portions of the judicial power from the Supreme Court to inferior federal courts"). Clinton 
seems to acknowledge that not reading the Exceptions and Regulations Clause in this 
manner would require an understanding of Article III that lacks any congressional 
authority over inferior court jurisdiction, the proposition put forth in this Article. See id. 
("[T]he framers must have intended the exceptions and regulations clause to be read in 
conjunction and conformity with the mandatory first paragraph of the judiciary article, 
rather than in isolation, as it has most often been construed since the Convention. 
Otherwise, the deletion of the power to assign jurisdiction to the inferior federal courts 
would have left Congress without any explicit grant of authority in the judiciary article to 
so allocate the judicial power of the United States."). 
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Controversies to which the United States shall be a 
Party;-to Controversies between two or more 
States;-between a State and Citizens of another 
State;-between citizens of different States;-between 
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under 
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the 
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or 
Subjects. 120 
51 
Putting the two provisions together, it appears that whatever 
"inferior Courts" that Congress establishes are "vested" with a 
power that includes all of the "Cases" and "Controversies" to which 
the "judicial Power shall extend"; the use of the term "shall" here 
being imperative. 121 
Indeed, Justice Story long ago indicated that this language was 
critical when he wrote: 
The language of the [third] article throughout is 
manifestly designed to be mandatory upon the 
legislature. Its obligatory force is so imperative, that 
congress could not, without a violation of its duty, have 
refused to carry it into operation. The judicial power 
of the United States shall be vested (not may be vested) 
in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as 
120 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
121 See, e.g., David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regarding the Judicial 
Branch, 1999 BYU L. REV. 75, 133 ("Article III certainly is imperative in mood. The only 
candid reading of the text imports a mandatory duty to vest. 'Shall' is an auxiliary verb 
that normally denotes more than mere futurity or prediction; in the second or third person 
it ordinarily expresses some degree of compulsion by the will of the speaker (here, 'We the 
People'), rather than mere preference, wish, or recommendation. The word usually is 
indicative of command, converting what otherwise would be a declarative statement into an 
imperative one."). Engdahl's understanding of the imperative meaning of the term "shall'' 
did not lead him to embrace the constitutional vesting thesis propounded in this Article. 
See id. at 134 ("Of course, this does not mean that Congress must vest the full range of 
contemplated subject matter jurisdiction in each federal court, if more than one exists. 
Should Congress elect to have more than the one federal court constitutionally required, 
Article Ill's mandate could be satisfied by distributing the subject matter competence-so 
long as every fraction of the constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction was vested somewhere 
in the judicial branch."). 
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congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish. 
Could congress have lawfully refused to create a 
supreme court, or to vest in it the constitutional 
jurisdiction? . . .  But one answer can be given to th[is] 
question[ ] : it must be in the negative.122 
Although not the position advocated by Justice Story, the question 
posed at the end of this excerpt might as easily have read: Could 
Congress have created inferior courts but lawfully refused to vest 
in them the constitutional jurisdiction? Justice Story deftly drove 
home the point when he highlighted the mandatory nature of the 
vesting clauses of the two preceding constitutional articles: 
The same expression, "shall be vested," occurs in 
other parts of the constitution, in defining the powers 
of the other co-ordinate branches of the government. 
The first article declares that "all legislative powers 
herein granted shall be vested in a congress of the 
United States." Will it be contended that the 
legislative power is not absolutely vested? [T]hat the 
words merely refer to some future act, and mean only 
that the legislative power may hereafter be vested? 
The second article declares that "the executive power 
shall be vested in a president of the United States of 
America." Could congress vest it in any other person; 
or, is it to await their good pleasure, whether it is to 
vest at all? It is apparent that such a construction, in 
either case, would be utterly inadmissible. Why, then, 
is it entitled to a better support in reference to the 
judicial department?123 
Again, Justice Story's ultimate view was that, though mandatory, 
the Constitution could distribute the Judicial Power within the 
Federal Judiciary as a whole. But might an equally plausible view 
be-given the mandatory nature of the vesting and the "and in" 
122 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328-29 (1816). 
123 Id. at 329-30. 
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language of Section 2 highlighted above-that this imperative 
vesting applies with equal force to the inferior courts on their own? 
Professor John Harrison points out that although the "Judicial 
Power" may be vested in the inferior federal courts, that term is 
different from the concept of "jurisdiction," with the latter being a 
more narrow concept over which Congress may exercise control. 124 
Although this distinction between Judicial Power and jurisdiction 
may be a valid one, it would remain to be established that 
Congress is given authority to control the latter. Such authority is 
traditionally drawn not from an express grant of jurisdictional 
control in Article III but rather from Congress's power to "ordain 
and establish" inferior Article III courts.125 Must the lesser 
authority to delimit the jurisdiction of these inferior courts 
necessarily fall with the greater authority to create and abolish 
them?126 While the creator ordinarily might presume the power to 
shape the scope of authority its creation will enjoy, Article III does 
124 John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and 
the Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 214-15 (1997). 
12s U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
126 The greater-includes-the-lesser argument is well-worn. See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 
319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) (''The Congressional power to ordain and establish inferior courts 
includes the power 'of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or 
exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character 
which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.' " (quoting Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 
(3 How.) 236, 245 (1845))); Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional 
Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 143, 
145 (1982) ("Since Congress need not have created lower courts, it could just as easily 
abolish them altogether. Because it retains this broad power, Congress may exercise the 
'lesser' power of 'abolishing' lower federal courts as to certain issues-i.e., limit their 
jurisdiction."). This argument is also alluded to in Gunther, supra note 9, at 899: 
The second part of that sentence is relied upon heavily by those who assert 
that there exists a broad congressional authority to curtail the jurisdiction 
of the lower federal courts: since "inferior Courts" are not mandated by the 
Constitution and since Congress has explicit discretion whether or not to 
"ordain and establish" them, the argument goes, Congress presumptively 
may give or take away whatever portions of the ''judicial Power" it wishes. 
Professor Paul Bator referenced, but did not make, this "mechanical" argument regarding 
Congress's authority to regulate inferior court jurisdiction. See Bator, supra note 6, at 1031 
("The position that Congress has this additional power to 'pick and choose,' to create lower 
federal courts and give them less than the entire federal judicial power, is not based 
primarily on the mechanical argument that the greater power (not to create such courts at 
all) must include the lesser (to create them but limit their jurisdiction)."). 
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not leave the cognizance of these inferior courts an open matter. 
To the contrary, Article III is clear that although Congress gives 
inferior courts their life, the same Article vests those courts with 
the "judicial Power of the United States," which "shall extend" to 
the list of matters enumerated therein. Further, the overall 
constitutional framework alters the ordinary presumption that the 
power to create an entity comprehends the authority to shape and 
structure its workings as the creator sees fit. The plan of the 
Convention was one that concerned itself mightily with achieving 
as near as possible a separation of one department from the other 
two, with a specific eye towards devising a Judiciary that was 
independent and free to exercise its Judicial Power. 127 The clear 
wording of the text vests the full Judicial Power in the inferior 
federal courts. Implying a congressional power to deny the inferior 
federal courts some portion of that same power opposes the 
principle of judicial independence the Framers were intended to 
enshrine. 
Indeed, we have a record of the extent of the drafters' 
commitment to judicial independence; the drafters unanimously 
voted to strike the following language from an early draft of what 
would become Article III: "The Legislature may assign any part of 
the jurisdiction abovementioned (except the trial of the President 
of the United States) in the manner, and under the limitations 
which it shall think proper, to such Inferior Courts, as it shall 
constitute from time to time."128 The rejection of this clause leads 
to two conclusions. First, it can hardly be claimed that Congress 
implicitly enjoys an authority that the drafters voted to eliminate. 
The power that the delegates to the Convention withdrew from 
Congress-the power to assign "part of the jurisdiction" and "in 
the manner, and under the limitations" Congress thought proper­
is the very power that Congress arrogated to itself in the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 and has enjoyed ever since. 129 Second, that this 
127 See infra Part II. 
128 Compare Session of Monday, August 6, 1787, supra note 15, at 334 (presenting an 
early draft of Article III), with Session of Monday, August 27, 1787, supra note 16, at 476 
(striking the quoted provision from the draft). 
129 See supra Part III.A-B. 
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amendment to the draft Constitution was part of a comprehensive 
effort to shore up the independence of the Judiciary in the 
enjoyment and exercise of its Judicial Power is evident. Clearly, 
the power to assign only a "part" of the jurisdiction extended to the 
federal courts would give Congress the ability to undermine and 
marginalize the inferior federal courts by manipulating their 
jurisdiction.130 If Congress felt inclined against the positions that 
the courts were taking in a particular field, it could respond with 
the expedient of withdrawing from them all cognizance of such 
matters.131 Such a state of affairs would not reflect the judicial 
independence the Founders sought, but rather would subordinate 
the inferior courts to the will of the Federal Legislature. The 
principles of judicial independence and separation of powers held 
so dear by those who drafted and adopted the Constitution132 
should not be deemed to include any caveat that would permit 
congressional authority of this kind. 
Several members of Congress who initially debated the 
Judiciary Act offered a sound reason for supposing that the 
Constitution compelled the vesting of the full Judicial Power in 
whatever inferior courts Congress created. The failure to vest 
inferior federal courts with such authority would leave the 
adjudication of important matters within the Judicial Power of the 
United States in the hands of the state courts, a result that would 
be both imprudent and arguably inconsistent with the plan of the 
Constitution. Debate revealed several iterations of this argument. 
The most notable occurred in response to a motion to amend the 
proposed Judiciary Act to eliminate a provision for U.S. district 
courts in favor of instituting inferior federal courts solely with 
admiralty jurisdiction: 
130 See Dundas v. Bowler, 8 F. Cas. 28, 28-29 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 4140) ("If congress 
can impose this restriction, they may go farther, and impose other restrictions, as their 
discretion may dictate. In this way a constitutional right may be modified or taken away in 
whole or in part, as congress may determine."). 
131 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 8, at 321 ("[P]erhaps the most controversial proposals to 
limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts have been those that reflect a substantive 
disagreement with the way the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts, or both have 
resolved particular issues."). 
132 See supra notes 43-48, 54-65 and accompanying text. 
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There is another important consideration; that is, 
how far the constitution stands in the way of this 
motion. It is declared by [the Constitution] that the 
judicial power of the United States shall be vested in 
one supreme, and in such inferior courts as Congress 
shall from time to time establish. Here is no 
discretion, then, in Congress to vest the judicial power 
of the United States in any other tribunal than in the 
Supreme Court and the inferior courts of the United 
States. It is further declared that the judicial power of 
the United States shall extend to all cases of a 
particular description. How is that power to be 
administered? Undoubtedly by the tribunals of the 
United States; if the judicial power of the United 
States extends to those specified cases, it follows 
indisputably that the tribunals of the United States 
must likewise extend to them. 133 
Here we see the suggestion that Congress may not vest any of the 
Judicial Power of the United States in state courts, which is 
precisely what would occur-albeit by default-if Congress created 
no inferior federal courts or if Congress created inferior federal 
courts whose jurisdiction did not extend to the full complement of 
cases and controversies outlined in Article 111.134 
Other Members emphasized the imprudence of limiting the 
jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts in the manner proposed: 
183 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 831-32 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. William 
Smith) (emphasis added); see also id. at 843 (statement of Rep. James Madison) ("[I]n the 
new constitution a regular system is provided; the Legislative power is made effective for its 
objects; the Executive is co-extensive with the Legislative, and it is equally proper that this 
should be the case with the Judiciary."). 
134 See also id. at 835 (statement of Rep. Egbert Benson) ("It is not left to the election of 
the Legislature of the United States whether we adopt or not a judicial system like the one 
before us; the words in the constitution are plain and full, and must be carried into 
operation."). This is not offered to suggest or endorse the idea that state courts may not 
enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over some or all of the cases and controversies within the 
Judicial Power of the United States, but merely to reflect contemporaneous impressions of 
the extent to which the full Judicial Power was vested in inferior federal courts. 
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[W]hat is the object of the present motion? Sir, it goes 
to divest the Government of one of its most essential 
branches; if this is destroyed, your constitution is but 
the shadow of a Government. 
Is it not essential that a Government possess within 
itself the power necessary to carry its laws into 
execution? But the honorable gentleman proposes to 
leave this business to a foreign authority, totally 
independent of this Legislature, whether our 
ordinances shall have efficacy or not. Would this be 
prudent, even if it were in our power?135 
57 
The argument now becomes even clearer. Even if Congress had 
the authority to create inferior federal courts neutered of all but 
their admiralty jurisdiction, doing so would undermine the very 
government the Constitution was designed to create. This very 
prudential argument is what buttresses the constitutional point: 
The plan of the Convention was to overcome the deficiencies of the 
Articles of Confederation to create a strong national government 
whose laws were supreme and that had the capacity-through its 
Judiciary-to see to that end. 136 Any interpretation of Article III 
that permitted Congress to create inferior federal courts that 
lacked some component of the full Judicial Power of the United 
States would thus be inconsistent with the plan of the Convention 
because not only would judicial independence be undermined, but 
135 Id. at 836 (statement of Rep. Theodore Sedgwick) (emphasis added); see also id. at 837-
38 (statement of Rep. Fisher Ames) ("[U]ntil miracles shall become more common than 
ordinary events, . . .  he should think it a wonderful felicity of invention to propose the 
expedient of hiring out our judicial power, and employing courts not amenable to our laws, 
instead of instituting them ourselves as the constitution requires."). 
136 See, e.g., The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania (Dec. 4, 1787) 
(statement of James Wilson), reprinted in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, at 415, 459 
(criticizing the then-current government of the Articles of Confederation); cf 1 ANNALS OF 
CONG. 837 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Fisher Ames) ("The judicial 
power is, in fact, highly important to the Government . . .  because by this means its laws are 
peaceably carried into execution. We know, by experience, what a wretched system that is 
which is divested of this power."). 
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the ability of the federal government to ensure that its laws were 
properly executed and preserved as supreme would be gutted. 137 
To be sure, the soundness of this alternative view of 
congressional authority is questionable, as critics of this viewpoint 
abound. Professor Theodore Eisenberg suggested long ago that 
reading Article III to vest inferior federal courts with cognizance of 
the full array of matters outlined in Section 2 is "faulty."138 It is 
important to note, however, that he based his critique of the 
constitutional vesting thesis on a policy argument, not on 
interpretation of the constitutional text, and rooted it in his 
debatable belief that the Constitution requires the creation of 
inferior federal courts. 139 His argument, that "an overabundance 
of federal forums with unrestricted jurisdiction to hear all federal 
cases could in fact undermine the judiciary,"140 might be an apt 
description of the consequences of the constitutional vesting thesis, 
but it does not speak to whether a proper understanding of Article 
Ill's text, structure, and history warrant an acceptance of the 
position nonetheless. 
Other critics have challenged the constitutional vesting thesis 
on the ground that the ''Madisonian Compromise"-the decision to 
leave the creation of inferior federal courts to Congress rather 
creating them in the Constitution141-warrants the conclusion that 
Congress has the power to regulate the jurisdiction of lower 
federal courts. 142 According to Professor Paul Bator, 
137 Congressman Sedgwick buttressed this point by recounting the widespread scoffiawry 
of the states under the Articles of Confederation with respect to an American treaty with 
Great Britain concerning the debts of Americans owed to British subjects. 1 ANNALS OF 
CONG. 837 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Theodore Sedgwick) (noting 
that "State after State" made laws contrary to the national treaty with Britain and that 
"the State Judiciaries could not, or did not, decide contrary to their State ordinances"). 
138 Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court 
Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498, 514-15 (1974). 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 515. 
141 FALLON ET AL., supra note 8, at 319. 
142 See Bator, supra note 6, at 1031 (arguing that the purpose of the compromise was to 
give Congress discretion over creation and jurisdiction of the lower federal courts); Gunther, 
supra note 9, at 912 (arguing the same). 
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The essence of that compromise was an agreement 
that the question whether access to the lower federal 
courts was necessary to assure the effectiveness of 
federal law should not be answered as a matter of 
constitutional principle, but rather, should be left a 
matter of political and legislative judgment . . . .  It 
would make nonsense of that notion to hold that the 
only power to be exercised is the all-or-nothing power 
to decide whether none or all of the cases to which the 
federal judicial power extends need the haven of a 
lower federal court. 143 
59 
Bator's view conflicts with the evidence from the Convention 
reviewed above. Although it is possible that implicit in the 
Madisonian Compromise was an understanding that Congress 
would have the discretion to dole out to inferior federal courts 
some lesser portion of the Judicial Power of Article III, the 
Framers explicitly rejected proposed language that would have 
invested Congress with exactly such a power.144 Indeed, beyond 
the Madisonian Compromise and repeated indications that the 
constitutional vesting thesis "has been repudiated by an unbroken 
line of authoritative judicial and legislative precedent,"145 Bator 
offers little more to commend the traditional view of congressional 
authority than the Court ever has. 
The following comment from Bator thus overstates the case for 
the traditional view: ''The Constitution contains many provisions 
that are not at all clear. It does, however, contain a few that are 
clear. One of the clearest is the power of Congress to regulate the 
jurisdiction of federal ' [t]ribunals inferior to the Supreme 
Court.' "146 Article III says nothing of Congress's authority to 
regulate the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts, a fact that is 
rooted in the Framer's excision of a clause that would have 
granted such authority from the proposed text. Further, 
143 Bator, supra note 6, at 1031. 
144 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
145 Bator, supra note 6, at 1031. 
146 Id. at 1030 (emphasis added). 
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Article III explicitly gives Congress such regulatory authority 
when it comes to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 
strongly indicating that the failure to extend such authority with 
respect to the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts means that 
it was excluded; expressio unius est exclusio alterius. To suggest 
that the contrary view is one of the "clearest" aspects of the 
Constitution cannot be simply accepted uncritically. 
Professor Akhil Amar has offered a plausible argument in 
response to the constitutional vesting thesis with his idea that 
Section 2 of Article III has "two tiers" of matters that comprise the 
Judicial Power, one mandatory and one discretionary. 147 
Specifically, his argument is as follows: Because Section 2 extends 
the Judicial Power to "all cases" but then just to "controversies" 
rather than all controversies of a particular kind, the first tier of 
Section 2-addressing "cases"-is mandatory and must be fully 
vested in some federal court while the second tier-covering 
"controversies"-is permissive and allows Congress to decide what 
portion of those matters inferior courts may entertain.148 
There are two ways to respond to this argument. First, the 
omission of the word "all" from the portion of the Clause referring 
to those controversies that "shall" comprise part of the Judicial 
Power could be read simply as an indication that state courts could 
concurrently entertain such controversies. The use of "all" for the 
series of cases listed in the initial portion of the Clause would then 
be read as indicative of a command that the entirety of cases 
falling within such description are within the Judicial Power, 
which is vested exclusively in the Federal Judiciary whose 
members are to have life tenure and protected compensation. This 
reading would not permit state courts to exercise any part of this 
authority. This could have been the original understanding of the 
Framers; debates on the Judiciary Act of 1789 reveal that some 
members of Congress believed that the states could not exercise 
147 Amar, supra note 38, at 240. 
148 See id. ("The implication of the text, while perhaps not unambiguous, is strong: 
although the judicial power must extend to all cases in the first three categories, it may, but 
need not, extend to all cases in the last six. The choice concerning the precise scope of 
federal jurisdiction in the latter set of cases seems to be given to Congress .. .. "). 
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jurisdiction over those matters falling within the Judicial Power. 149 
However, this interpretation has long been rejected. Both 
Congress150 and the Court151 have held that states may exercise 
jurisdiction in the cases listed after the "alf' modifier of Section 2. 
Alexander Hamilton, writing in The Federalist No. 82 also seemed 
to reject this view when he wrote, 
I am even of opinion that in every case in which they 
were not expressly excluded by the future acts of the 
national legislature, they will of course take 
cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give 
birth. . . . The judiciary power of every government 
looks beyond its own local or municipal laws, and in 
civil cases lays hold of all subjects of litigation between 
parties within its jurisdiction, though the causes of . 
dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant 
part of the globe. Those of Japan, not less than of New 
149 See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 844 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. 
James Madison) ("On the whole, . . .  [I cannot] see how it could be made compatible with the 
constitution, or safe to the Federal interests, to make a transfer of the Federal jurisdiction 
to the State courts . . . .  "); id. at 850 (statement of Rep. William Smith) (''The words, 'shall 
be vested,' have great energy, they are words of command; they leave no discretion to 
Congress to parcel out the Judicial powers of the Union to State judicatures . . . .  Does not, 
then, the constitution, in the plainest and most unequivocal language, preclude us from 
allotting any part of the Judicial authority of the Union to the State judicature?"). 
150 See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, § 9 (granting federal district courts 
only concurrent jurisdiction with state courts over claims by foreign citizens arising from 
the violation of a treaty and common law claims by the United States when the amount in 
controversy exceeded one hundred dollars). 
161 The Supreme Court spoke of state court authority to hear matters falling within the 
Article III Judicial Power thusly: 
It is certainly true that state courts of "general jurisdiction" can adjudicate 
cases invoking federal statutes, such as § 1983, absent congressional 
specification to the contrary. "Under [our] system of dual sovereignty, we 
have consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are 
thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws 
of the United States," Tafflin, v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990). That this 
would be the case was assumed by the Framers, see The Federalist No. 82, 
pp. 492-493 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Indeed, that state courts could enforce 
federal law is presumed by Article III of the Constitution, which leaves to 
Congress the decision whether to create lower federal courts at all. 
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 366--67 (2001). 
62 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1 
York, may furnish the objects of legal discussion to our 
courts . . . .  [T]he inference seems to be conclusive that 
the State courts would have a concurrent jurisdiction 
in all cases arising under the laws of the Union where 
it was not expressly prohibited. 152 
In the end, the matter is sufficiently unclear, and one may resolve 
the matter by following the collective wisdom of Congress and the 
Court (echoed by Hamilton) that jurisdiction over "cases" was not 
to be exclusive of the states, at least for our present purposes.153 
An alternative understanding of the lack of the modifier "all" 
with respect to the enumerated controversies is that the Judicial 
Power extends to such controversies, but the federal courts retain 
discretion to determine whether to exercise jurisdiction over all 
such matters. This is a slight but important variant of the 
interpretation to which it is opposed. Amar's two-tiered view 
suggests that the Constitution distributes identified controversies 
to inferior federal courts according to the wishes of Congress 
because the Constitution does not extend the Judicial Power to 
"all" such controversies. 154 But the fact that the Judicial Power 
does not specify "all" such controversies does not necessarily lead 
to the conclusion that the Constitution vests Congress with any 
role in determining which of these controversies the courts may 
entertain. No language in Article III makes such a suggestion, 
and, as we have already seen, the Framers rejected a 
congressional role in manipulating the jurisdiction of the inferior 
federal courts during the Federal Convention. 155 So if any 
discretion exists to forbear from the exercise of jurisdiction over 
some subset of the controversies described in Section 2, perhaps 
that discretion lies with the Federal Judiciary. 
Ultimately, Professor Daniel Meltzer does the best job of 
dismantling Amar's two-tier theory but does so in the direction of 
152 THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 4 78-79. 
163 My purpose here is not to defend or establish the notion that federal courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction over the matters enumerated in Section 2 of Article III. It is beyond 
the scope of this Article to address the exclusivity issue. 
154 Amar, supra note 38, at 229-30. 
155 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
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arguing that none of the nine enumerated classes of cases must be 
mandatorily within the cognizance of the inferior federal courts. 
Meltzer echoes the idea of another commentator that the Framers 
used the modifier "alf' to emphasize that the cases falling within 
the Judicial Power were to include both criminal and civil matters, 
a clarification not necessary for an enumeration of "controversies," 
which were generally understood to be only civil in nature.156 
Setting that point aside, Meltzer demonstrates that· there is not 
really any evidence supporting the idea that the Framers placed 
the weight on the use of the word "all" in Section 2 that Amar 
does. 157 Surely a specification of such import would have 
commanded at least a remark by one of the gentlemen considering 
the proposed Constitution. None can be found, a fact that Meltzer 
treats as weighing heavily against Amar's thesis. 158 
Finally, does the fact that the First Congress-comprised of 
members who participated in the Federal Constitutional 
Convention159-itself rejected the constitutional vesting thesis 
undermine its validity? The efforts of Convention delegates to rid 
Article III of proposed provisions that would have provided for 
greater congressional authority over the jurisdiction of the inferior 
156 Meltzer, supra note 5, at 1575 (citing William A, Fletcher, Correspondence, Exchange 
on the Eleventh Amendment, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 118, 131, 133 (1990)). 
157 For example, after enumerating the cases and controversies that fell within the 
Judicial Power, Edmund Pendleton, President of the Virginia Convention, said, "Without 
entering into a distinction of all its parts, I believe it will be found that they are all cases of 
general and not local concern. The necessity and propriety of a federal jurisdiction, in all 
such cases, must strike every gentleman." The Debates in the Convention of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia (June 18, 1788), reprinted in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 27, 
at 1, 518. Clearly Pendleton did not distinguish between two tiers of jurisdiction here but 
rather saw "all such cases" as necessitating federal jurisdiction. 
158 Meltzer, supra note 5, at 1578-79 (''The short of the matter is that Amar has not 
identified any speech at the Convention or ratification debates that articulated a distinction 
between mandatory and permissive jurisdictions."). 
159 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 420 (1821) ("A contemporaneous 
exposition of the constitution .. . is the judiciary act itself. We know that in the Congress 
which passed that act were many eminent members of the Convention which formed the 
constitution."); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Original Intent in the First Congress, 71 Mo. L. REV. 687, 
689 (2006) ("At least twenty-eight members of the House and fourteen members of the 
Senate had been delegates to their respective state ratifying conventions. Nine delegates to 
the Constitutional Convention served in the House and eleven served in the Senate." 
(footnotes omitted)). 
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federal courts offers at least one compelling counterweight to that 
evidence.160 Further, Professor Charles Warren long ago 
uncovered the fact that members of Congress who were 
disgruntled with the breadth of Article Ill's grant of jurisdiction 
used the Judiciary Act of 1789 to accomplish a narrowing of 
authority that proponents failed to get in the final document 
emerging from the Federal Convention. 161 To the extent that there 
is evidence of sentiment within the First Congress both that the 
jurisdictional grant of Article III was overly broad and that the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 was the opportunity to correct that error,162 
such evidence could undermine the value of pointing to the actions 
of the First Congress as confirming evidence that the 
constitutional vesting thesis is invalid.163 
160 See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text. 
161 See Warren, supra note 9, at 62--63 (" 'I am satisfied to see a spirit prevailing that 
promises to send this system [the judicial system designed by the Judiciary Act of 1789] out, 
free from those vexations and abuses that might have been warranted by the terms of the 
Constitution.' " (quoting Letter of Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (May 28, 1789), in 2 
THE LETTERS OF RICHARD HENRY LEE (James Curtis Ballagh ed. 1912))); see also Meltzer, 
supra note 5, at 1611 ("[T]oday's congressional debates are uncertain evidence of 
contemporary constitutional understandings. Similar caution is equally appropriate in 
looking back to 1789, when the new legislators may have been re-fighting old battles about 
the Constitution, unwilling to carry out any constitutional imperatives they divined." 
(footnotes omitted)). 
162 Amar has speculated that Anti-Federalist dominance of the First Congress accounts for 
its legislative efforts in directions potentially at odds with the vision of the Convention. See 
Amar, supra note 38, at 259 ("Because the Anti-Federalist forces wielded far more power in 
the first Congress than they had at Philadelphia, it would not be surprising if the Act only 
imperfectly reflected the Federalist vision that had earlier been crystallized in the 
Constitution." (citing Warren, supra note 9, at 53)). But see Sirico, supra note 159, at 692 
("The Federalists dominated the new Congress, initially holding forty-nine of fifty-nine 
seats in the House and twenty of twenty-two seats in the Senate." (citing CHARLENE BANGS 
BICKFORD & KENNETH R. BoWLING, BIRTH OF THE NATION: THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 
1789-1791, at 4 (1989))). 
163 Meltzer offers an additional reason to temper the credence one accords to the views of 
the inaugural legislators of our Union; he surmises that there may be less value in the 
opinions of the Members of the First Congress because they were "confused": 
[O]ne thing I have learned from delving into the surviving records of 
debates about the Act is how many of the participants were confused . . . .  
Perhaps the most fundamental example of confusion involves the question 
whether article III obliges Congress to create lower federal courts or give 
them jurisdiction over any particular matters. The history of the 
Convention clearly shows that the answer is no . . . .  Yet in the first 
Congress . . .  it was not uncommon to hear just the opposite asserted. 
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In sum, when one combines the language of the Vesting Clause 
with the history of Article III-which includes a rejection of 
congressional power to distribute "any part" of the federal 
jurisdiction to inferior federal courts-and its structure-which 
elsewhere includes a similar congressional power over Supreme 
Court appellate jurisdiction, it at least becomes more plausible to 
suppose that the Constitution reflects a lack of congressional 
authority over inferior court jurisdiction rather than the presence 
of such power. 
What would be the implications associated with an embrace of 
the constitutional vesting thesis? The most troubling implication 
arising from an acceptance of the constitutional vesting thesis is 
that congressional curtailment of the jurisdiction of the inferior 
federal courts to a subset of the cases and controversies 
enumerated in Article III, Section 2 is impermissible. Clearly, to 
suggest such a proposition is audacious. 164 If members of the First 
Congress presumed the authority to impose such limits, surely any 
assertion to the contrary must be untenable. 165 Although members 
of the First Congress are entitled to some degree of deference, can 
they bind us to constitutional understandings that are 
unsupported by the history, text, and structure of the Constitution 
itself? There is also the point that Warren's research surrounding 
the Judiciary Act of 1789 revealed: Members of the First Congress 
were politicians with particular agendas, most notably an agenda 
aimed at undoing much of what Article III had done-vest the 
Meltzer, supra note 5, at 1610-11. 
164 Cf Dundas v. Bowler, 8 F. Cas. 28, 29 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 4140) ("Its 
constitutionality has not been questioned, and, after so many years of acquiescence, it may 
excite some surprise that it is now questioned."). 
165 The Supreme Court has treated the views of the First Congress as dispositive on an 
issue and has used their actions as the bases for resolving constitutional questions in the 
past. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200 (2003) ("History reveals an unbroken 
congressional practice of granting to authors of works with existing copyrights the benefit of 
term extensions so that all under copyright protection will be governed evenhandedly under 
the same regime. As earlier recounted, the First Congress accorded the protections of the 
Nation's first federal copyright statute to existing and future works alike." (citation 
omitted)). 
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inferior courts with broad jurisdiction over a wide swath of cases 
and controversies.166 
V. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately the traditional view challenged here-that Congress 
has authority over inferior federal court jurisdiction-is too 
entrenched and too relied upon to doubt at this late stage. Indeed, 
the historical evidence and textual arguments presented above are 
far from conclusive on these matters. Further, the practical 
consequences of embracing the constitutional vesting thesis would 
be the allowance of all Article III disputes in the federal courts, 
regardless of the amount in controversy167 or the remoteness of the 
federal issue;168 such breadth could result in the inundation of the 
federal courts with too many matters of too little significance. 
However, value abounds in the insights gained from our 
discussion. Thinking more broadly about the Judicial Power may 
enable us to see the Judiciary not as the weakest of the three 
branches, but as a truly equal branch that can exercise all of that 
power with little congressional interference. 
Perhaps accepting the alternative view developed above would 
be easier were one to take the traditional, prevailing view of 
Judicial Power to its ultimate endpoint. Under the traditional 
view, Congress can completely confine inferior federal court 
jurisdiction to any limited set of matters as it sees fit. Thus, if 
Congress does not like the decisions of the inferior courts 
regarding a matter, jurisdiction-stripping legislation is the handy 
solution. It is alarming enough that Congress has the ability to 
166 See supra note 89. 
167 Harrison noted this defect in response to Clinton's view of mandatory vesting of the 
Judicial Power in the Federal Judiciary collectively. See Harrison, supra note 124, at 207 
("Among the objections to Clinton's thesis is that it would fill the federal courts with 
diversity cases."). 
168 The "ingredient" theory put forth in Osborn v. Ban.k of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824) would permit much broader federal question jurisdiction were the 
current limiting interpretations of the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, not in 
place. 
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impact the Judiciary through its power over procedure, 169 
budgetary starvation,17° and salary stagnation. 171 The resulting 
picture of absolute domination by the Legislative Branch that 
results from coupling those procedural and fiscal controls with the 
power of jurisdiction-stripping just seems too at odds with the plan 
of the Convention to be accepted uncritically. That said, the 
constitutional vesting thesis offered above only goes so far in 
protecting inferior federal courts against congressional 
interference; Congress, were it so inclined, could still express its 
displeasure by deciding to abolish the inferior federal courts 
altogether, although it is highly unlikely that it would ever do 
so. 112 
In the end, it is unlikely that the constitutional vesting thesis 
propounded herein will be embraced; however, giving some 
thought to the possibility of this alternative vision may make 
169 See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941) ("Congress has undoubted power 
to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts .. . .  "); Bank of the U.S. v. Halstead, 
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 61 (1825) ("Congress might regulate the whole practice of the 
Courts, if it was deemed expedient so to do .... "). Further reflection might permit me to 
question this plenary authority over judicial procedure; however, it is beyond the scope of 
this Article to address that issue. 
170 See Mark C. Miller, When Congress Attacks the Federal Courts, 56 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 1015, 1023-24 (2006) (''More generally, overall appropriations for the judicial branch 
have been a source of conflict and concern between Congress and the federal courts. In 
addition to judicial salaries, the federal courts depend upon Congress for funds for new 
judgeships, courthouses, staff, technology, and a variety of other purposes. AB I have 
written previously, 'The annual appropriations process provides a clear avenue to see the 
different institutional perspectives of the Supreme Court and of Congress. The courts 
rightly see themselves as an independent third branch, and many judges seem to resent 
Congress's interference with their budget requests.' Congress, however, often views the 
federal courts as just one more federal agency begging for funds. " (footnotes omitted)). 
171 See id. at 1021 ("Congress has sometimes used judicial salaries to send a clear message 
to the courts. For example, in 1964, Congress increased the salaries for lower federal judges 
by $7,500 per year but increased the salaries for Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court by only 
$4,500 per year . . . .  'The $3,000 differential clearly reflected a direct Congressional 
reprimand to the Supreme Court.' " (quoting JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER & LARRY L. BERG, 
THE SUPREME COURT AND CONGRESS 8 (1972))); id. ("(I]n 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1999, 
Congress blocked previously announced 'automatic' cost of living increases for various 
governmental officials, including federal judges, that had been provided for in the Ethics 
Reform Act of 1989. "). 
172 Such a maneuver would have to endure the obstacle of life tenure for incumbent 
federal judges as well as confront the utter disarray that would result from a shuttering of 
inferior federal courts in the United States of today. 
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Congress more circumspect in its manipulation of inferior court 
jurisdiction going forward. Furthermore, perhaps this historical 
evidence will lead courts and academics to reconsider the long-held 
presumption of plenary congressional power over jurisdiction and 
show more skepticism towards future efforts to curtail the Judicial 
Power of the inferior federal courts. 
